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ABSTRACT
JULIA PEOPLES: RECONCEPTUALIZING CANNABIS. The Case for Demystifying,
Decriminalizing, and Destigmatizing. (Under the direction of Dr. William Berry)
Inflammatory rhetoric and increasingly punitive drug policies dominated marijuana
politics in the past. Today, as 36 have legalized cannabis in some form and 17 states have
legalized recreational marijuana, the federal government continues to perpetuate policies of the
past. The following analysis investigates rhetoric and policies that led to the War on Drugs as
well as their outcomes, the dramatic shift in public opinion as states began to legalize marijuana,
and the successes and failures of state cannabis programs to identify gaps within the MORE Act,
the ideal policy, and politically viable incremental change. State programs are incapable of
addressing issues regarding data collection, research, and equity. The MORE Act passed by the
House of Representatives in December 2020 presents a semi-comprehensive federal reform
option. The ideal cannabis reform, however, should address guidelines for federal regulators,
barriers to employment and entrepreneurship, incentivize state cannabis legalization and
expedited expungements, expand research and data collection, and provide a framework for
federal communications. Despite the act’s shortcomings, it remains politically infeasible in
today’s polarized climate. Immediate incremental cannabis reform should take the form of action
by the Attorney General and Congressional action expanding cannabis research supply and
funding, requiring public health data collection, rescheduling marijuana, and authorizing doctors
to write prescriptions for medical marijuana.
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Chapter One
While cannabis has been illegal in the United States since 1937, an escalation of drug
policies and political rhetoric in the 1960s through the 1990s led to a massive increase in
incarceration and public concern. This chapter analyzes the rhetoric and policies that built the
current federal law regarding cannabis, as well as the shifts in public opinion that resulted from
these political changes. Finally, this chapter seeks to analyze the factors which contributed to the
recent shift in American politics and public opinion regarding cannabis that has resulted in a
myriad of state policies which conflict with federal law.
The War on Drugs
The juxtaposition between marijuana policymaking and shifting public opinion and state
policies regarding marijuana demands a federal solution. From the 1960s era of Law and Order
to today’s puzzle of legalized marijuana, American culture surrounding drugs, particularly
cannabis, has changed significantly. Influenced by inflammatory political rhetoric conflating
marijuana use with criminal activity, American citizens and policymakers have insisted on
stricter penalties to combat the perceived large-scale “abuse” of cannabis. This conflation results
in a separation between the reality of marijuana-related policies and the public’s perception of
the drug. States have led with cannabis reform, but the federal government has a responsibility
and an opportunity to shift from prohibition to decriminalization and communication.
After releasing fear-based propaganda for over 20 years regarding cannabis, Congress
enacted the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. This legislation amended the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 to provide further penalties for drug offenders. The original code did not differentiate
1

between opium, coca leaves, and marijuana, ascribing the same penalties for offenses regarding
all three (Cantor, 1961). With the passage of the Narcotic Control Act (1956), first-time
offenders for the unlawful acquisition of cannabis were sentenced to imprisonment for two to ten
years and faced a maximum fine of $20,000 (Cantor, 1961). The adoption of harsh penalties for
unlawful possession and transportation of marijuana - in addition to the already rampant hostile
anti-marijuana political rhetoric - caused a shift in the American discourse: the public viewed
drugs as a significant problem for the country.
The imposition of stricter sentencing laws resulted in a dramatic shift in the political
climate surrounding cannabis. Political elites moved public opinion toward more punitive
attitudes, but young Americans increasingly experimented with the drug. A rise in cannabis
usage correlated with the emerging counterculture in the 1960s, primarily involving “college
students, faculty, and protesters in the antiwar movement” (McKenna, 2014, p. 105). As a result,
many suburbanites began to associate the drug with youthful delinquency. The earlier century’s
propaganda further exacerbated this shift towards a “delinquent” marijuana user; consequently,
an underlying fear of the unknown skyrocketed in the American public. In 1969, 48% of
Americans responding to a Gallup poll said that “drug use was a serious problem in their
community” (Robison, 2002, para. 3). In that same year, Robison also suggested that “only 4%
of American adults said they had tried marijuana.” Misconceptions about the prevalence of the
drug and its dangers ran rampant. Indeed, 34% of the same poll respondents were unaware of the
effects of cannabis, but 43% percent thought “many or some high school kids” used it (para. 5).
60% of respondents believed that the drug was physically addictive. In the 1960s, with drug use
rising, the political climate set the stage for the longest war in American history: the war on
drugs.
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Nixon’s War On Drugs
In 1970, President Richard Nixon signed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act to rationalize America’s drug policy. Title II, known as The Controlled Substances
Act (1970), established five schedules of drugs based on medical value, harm, and abuse
potential. The act labeled Marijuana as a Schedule I drug and, thus, was relegated to a class of
drugs with high abuse potential; consequently, marijuana was equated to LSD and heroin, with
no accepted medical use in the United States, both recreationally and medically. The bipartisan
piece of legislation sought to organize the federal drug code flexibly. The act changed penalties
for trafficking depending on the drug’s schedule: the maximum prison sentence for Schedule I
drugs was 15 years; the maximum sentence for Schedule V drugs was one year (Courtwright,
2003). Penalties for possession included “no more than a year in prison and, at the discretion of
the court, probation for first offenders” (Courtwright, 2003, p. 12). Additionally, the bill
provided for no-knock warrants and funding for 300 new federal agents. The Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (1970) served as a nuanced piece of legislation,
providing a framework for further criminalizing cannabis users by placing it in the most punitive
category of drugs and expanding enforcement mechanisms while also removing mandatory
minimums. The act itself did not lead to harsher punishments for marijuana offenses; instead, it
set up a system in which the system could further demonize the drug and punish users more
harshly in the next decade.
While the Controlled Substances Act (1970) organized drugs into schedules and provided
law enforcement with more officers and options, it did not constitute a significant policy change.
The Nixon campaign had only just begun the agenda-setting stage for the drug issue. On June 17,
1971, Nixon announced that “public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse”
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(Nixon, 1971, para. 1). Between 1970 and 1973, the Nixon administration worked with the
nonprofit Advertising Council, releasing “approximately forty national television spots, sixteen
radio spots, eleven magazine ads, thirty-three newspaper ads, and more than a dozen billboards,”
which became known as the National Drug Abuse Information Campaign (Siff, 2018, p. 173).
The campaign failed to stop rising cannabis use, with 12% of respondents to a Gallup poll saying
they had tried marijuana in 1973, increasing eight percent during President Nixon’s first term
(Robison, 2002).
In addition to the official campaign, Nixon frequently spoke about the damage drug abuse
caused communities and families to invigorate “white, suburban voters” (Siff, 2018, p. 176).
This rhetoric surrounding drug abuse, which applied to harder drugs, also extended to marijuana.
Nixon’s rhetorical strategy included using the term dope to encompass drugs ranging from
heroin to cannabis. An analysis of Gallup polls found “that public concerns about drugs peaked
between 1971 and 1973,” and similarly “over six consecutive polls between 1971 and 1973,
drugs were never less than fifth in the national rankings, usually ranked second or third” (Siff,
2018, p. 177). Although more Americans were using marijuana, even more believed drug use
was a serious problem.
In the early 1970s, Nixon appointed a National Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse in response to political challenges regarding the drug’s Schedule I category (Shafer,
1972). In 1971, as the commission prepared their first report regarding the potential harm caused
by cannabis, Nixon stated, “even if the commission does recommend that it [marijuana] be
legalized, I will not follow that recommendation” (Belair, 1971, para. 2). The commission
recommended decriminalization of the drug. In the commission’s first report, Marihuana: A
Signal of Misunderstanding, Shafer (1972) noted that “marijuana’s relative potential for harm to
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the vast majority of individual users and its actual impact on society does not justify a social
policy designed to seek out and firmly punish those who use it” (p. 163). The commission
considered the elimination of marijuana use “unattainable” and therefore recommended “to the
public and its policy-makers a social control policy seeking to discourage marihuana use while
concentrating primarily on the prevention of heavy and very heavy use” (p. 168). The National
Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse recommended a “partial prohibition” system in
which “medical, educational, religious, and parental efforts to concentrate on reducing
irresponsible use and remedying its consequences” and the removal of “the criminal stigma and
the threat of incarceration” would work to combat abuse of the drug (Shafer, 1972, p. 189). The
Commission’s recommendations were ignored. On July 1, 1973, Nixon created the Drug
Enforcement Agency after declaring “an all-out global war on the drug menace” (Augustyn,
2020). The agency served to enforce drug-related laws and consolidate conflicting government
agencies under centralized leadership.
Despite Nixon’s success in creating societal fear surrounding drug abuse, drug use
continued to climb in the United States: by 1977, 24% of respondents in the Gallup poll had tried
marijuana (Robison, 2002). Concern about the prevalence and dangers of marijuana use rose
swiftly. When President Gerald Ford took office in 1974, “the pressure for strict anti-drug
policies” continued (St. John & Lewis, 2019, p. 20). Nevertheless, leniency slowly became the
norm on the state level, resulting in a gap between federal and state law. In 1973, Oregon became
the first state to decriminalize cannabis, with Alaska, California, Maine, Colorado, and Ohio
following suit in 1975. In 1976, Robert C. Randall appeared before the District of Columbia
Superior Court, appealing his conviction for the possession and cultivation of cannabis. He
argued that cannabis was medically necessary to treat his glaucoma. The court held that the
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“defendant’s interest in preserving sight outweighs government’s interests” (Randall v. U.S.,
1976). The Court recognized a medical value where the legislature had not, but this pattern
would not continue. Increasing evidence that cannabis posed little danger to society and
inflammatory political rhetoric from political elites led to confusion.
During the 1976 presidential campaign, President Jimmy Carter advocated for the
decriminalization of low-level marijuana offenses (St. John & Lewis, 2019). As president, Carter
pushed for drug policy reform, attempting to focus on rehabilitation instead of punishment. In
1977, President Carter asked Congress to “abolish all Federal criminal penalties for the
possession of small amounts of marijuana” (Wooten, 1977, para. 1). He argued that “penalties
against possession of a drug should not be more damaging to the individual than the drug itself”
(Wooten, 1977, para. 6). Because of administration scandals, economic scandal, and a
competitive presidential election, Carter’s visions of decriminalizing cannabis and transforming
the war on drugs never became policy. In 1981, when President Ronald Reagan took office, he
began expanding the War on Drugs quickly (Augustyn, 2020). By focusing on punishment rather
than treatment, the Reagan administration moved drug policy in America in the opposite
direction than Carter had hoped.
Reagan’s Escalation
During the 1980s, a rise in public concern over drug use and abuse set the stage yet again
for stricter penalties for users and distributors of illicit drugs. In 1982, Reagan announced from
the Rose Garden that “drugs already reach deeply into our social structure,” calling for
Americans to “brand drugs such as marijuana exactly for what they are— dangerous” (Westhoff,
2013, p. 14). While the Reagan administration stressed the prevalence and danger of drugs in
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America, marijuana use among those between 18 and 25 years old decreased by 15% between
1979 and 1982 (Westhoff, 2013). Nevertheless, public concern about drugs persisted.
In 1984, Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which reaffirmed the
federal government’s solution for the rise in drug use— more punishment, not treatment. The act
contained “increased federal penalties for the cultivation, possession, and sale of marijuana”
(Westhoff, 2013, p. 15). Around this time, political rhetoric began to focus on marijuana as a
gateway drug, which proved effective in altering public opinion. In 1985, two percent of
respondents to a Gallup poll regarding attitudes toward the most important problem facing the
country believed drugs and drug abuse were the most important problem (Gallup Trends, 2012).
In May 1989, the percentage of respondents who thought drugs and drug abuse were the most
important issues had risen to 27%. While the prevalence of drug use decreased in the 1980s,
concern surrounding drugs continued to increase significantly, and political rhetoric encouraged
fear. Beckett (1994) argues that “the politicization of the crime and drug issues has been the
result of their social construction by the mass media and especially state actors” (p. 444).
In 1986, the Reagan administration passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, allocating “even
more funding for law enforcement, laws, increased penalties, and prevention and educational
programs” (Westhoff, 2013, p. 16). Notably, this act allowed prosecutors to pursue the death
penalty for high-level drug traffickers. Reagan successfully implemented punishment-focused
policies for nonviolent offenders by framing drug policy as a moral issue and instilling fear in
Americans that rampant drug use and violent criminals had already infiltrated their communities.
These policies had an undeniable effect on incarceration rates: “there was more than a
400% increase between the 1980s and the 1990s in the chances that a drug arrest would
ultimately result in a prison sentence” (Bobo & Thompson, 2006, p. 451). As former President

7

George H. W. Bush took office, public concern shifted from drugs to crime more generally.
According to Gallup polls, 18% of respondents listed drugs and drug abuse as the most important
issue facing the country today in 1990, but that number fell to nine percent in 1994. On the other
hand, one percent of respondents listed crime as the most important issue facing the country in
1990, but 37% chose it in 1994 (Gallup Trends, 2012). This increased concern with violent
crime, however, did not lead to less punitive drug policies.
Under President George H. W. Bush, the federal government continued associating drug
users with violent criminals and formulated criminal justice policies that treated them as such. In
1990, the Bush administration developed a program known as ‘Smoke a Joint, Lose Your
License’ in response to widely varying cannabis policies between states (Ingram, 1994). The
federal government withheld federal highway funds from states that did not agree to suspend the
driver’s license of people convicted of a drug offense for six months, regardless of whether the
person convicted was driving at the time of arrest or not (Ingram, 1994). This policy and others
promoted by the Bush administration continued the federal tradition of failing to recognize any
medical use for cannabis or differentiate between marijuana and other illicit substances.
Clinton’s Crime Bill
As mass incarceration escalated within the United States, increasing drug use and
continued inflammatory rhetoric led to more punitive policies, despite evidence that they did not
work. When President Bill Clinton took office in 1993, he began speaking about the need for a
bipartisan omnibus crime bill. In his 1994 State of the Union Address, Clinton advocated for the
upcoming piece of legislation, referring to it as “the toughest crime bill in history.” That
legislation, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, did indeed overhaul a
large portion of the criminal justice system to create a more punitive environment for offenders.
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The act provided for 100,000 new police officers, $9.7 billion for prisons and $6.1 billion for
prevention programs, as well as $2.6 billion in funding for the FBI, DEA, INS, United States
Attorneys, and other Justice Department Components. Notably, the act also implemented a three
strikes rule, which required mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole for repeat
felony offenders, including some drug offenses. While conservative administrations previously
sought tough on crime policies, the unprecedented 1994 bipartisan Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act fundamentally altered federal criminal justice policies. By the time Clinton
signed the act into law, mass incarceration had exploded in the United States, and with those
convicted as a “habitual offender” sentenced to mandatory life without parole, incarceration rates
would only continue to grow.
A noticeable increase in the federal prison populations began in the late 1980s, primarily
due to the increasingly punitive policies used to place and keep drug offenders behind bars. Since
then, those serving time in federal prisons for drug offenses are in the overwhelming majority
due to the increase in punitive drug policies. Drawing on data from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, The Sentencing Project (2020) reports that in 1980, state prisons, federal prisons, and
jails held 40,900 individuals incarcerated for drug offenses. By 2018, that number had grown to
443,200 individuals incarcerated for drug offenses, and drug offenders accounted for just over
47% of the federal prison population (The Sentencing Project, 2020). The government’s
insistence on criminalizing marijuana and refusal to shift to a rehabilitative treatment model for
drug offenders has taken a toll on the prison system, communities most severely affected by
mass incarceration, and society.
Systemic racism affects every level of the criminal justice system, and drug policies
designed to criminalize people of color exacerbate the discrimination within the system. African
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American men face significantly higher incarceration rates than people of other races and
genders, with Latino men coming in second. Despite representing less than 14% of the general
population, in 2012, African Americans made up approximately 38% of federally sentenced drug
offenders. Likewise, while Hispanic or Latino Americans make up less than 17% of the general
population, they represented approximately 37% of federally sentenced drug offenders in 2012.
Meanwhile, white Americans, who make up 72% of the general population, constituted
approximately 21% of federally sentenced drug offenders in 2012 (U.S. Department of Justice,
2015). Academics have speculated and researched many potential causes and solutions for racial
bias within the criminal justice system; however, data still shows that racial minorities face
significantly higher arrest and incarceration rates for drug offenses in the United States.
In April 2016, a reporter from Harper’s Bazaar looked back on his notes from an
interview in 1994 with President Nixon’s domestic policy chief, John Ehrlichman, who
explained that the Nixon administration intended the racially disproportionate outcome. “The
Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar
left and black people,” Ehrlichman stated (Baum, 2016, para. 2). Ehrlichman continued, “We
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily,
we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up
their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news.” Perhaps the most damning
comment came at the end of his monologue: “Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of
course we did” (Baum, 2016, para. 2). Nixon’s campaigns succeeded with this strategy, and his
predecessors continued the rhetoric for years to follow. The prison population continued to climb
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as drug users’ equation to criminals took hold in the American psyche, and more punitive
punishments resulted.
Looking Ahead
Despite federal resistance, state laws continued to soften drug laws, reducing penalties
and shortening mandatory minimums. Since the initial decriminalization of marijuana in the
1970s, four different approaches to decriminalization have emerged. The federal government has
chosen prohibition, while state and local laws have varied between decriminalization, medical
use, and legalization. Pacula and Smart (2019) explains that decriminalization refers to a wide
variety of policies, from removing criminal status to a significant reduction of penalties
associated with marijuana offenses or only first-time offenders. Because of the variance within
decriminalized states, the term here loosely refers to policies ranging from reducing criminal
penalties to removing illegal status. The research goes on to explain that the first wave of
decriminalization occurred in the 1970s, California became the first state to recognize the
significant change in public opinion surrounding cannabis by legalizing marijuana for medical
use in 1996. As more states followed various decriminalization and medical marijuana policies,
the conflict between federal and state law grew. In 2009, President Obama’s administration
announced that the federal government would no longer interfere with state laws regarding
medical marijuana (Pacula & Smart, 2019). Between 2009 and 2013, 40 states eased their drug
laws in some manner (Desilver, 2014). As the federal government stepped back on enforcement,
many states chose leniency despite the drug’s Schedule I status.
In 2012, Colorado became the first state to legalize cannabis for recreational use. Today,
17 and the District of Columbia have legalized recreational marijuana, and 36 states allow legal
access through either medical or recreational policies. Despite this shift towards legalization,
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police made 608,775 arrests for possession of marijuana, and police made an additional 54,591
arrests for the sale or manufacture of marijuana in 2018 (FBI, 2018). In total, marijuana offenses
made up 40% of all drug arrests in 2018. Even in states with legal recreational marijuana,
inmates continue to serve time for marijuana possession or distribution. Inmates will continue to
serve long sentences due to the War on Drugs’ lasting policies without federal action.
After a series of bipartisan compromises in Congress, President Trump signed the First
Step Act of 2018, which developed a risk and needs assessment system and rehabilitative
programs while also increasing the amount of time served inmates can earn (James, 2020). James
explains that the act reduced mandatory minimum sentences and increased the severity of crime
required to a serious drug felony, defined as offenses which have a maximum of 10 years in
prison, rather than the previous trigger of any drug felony. The act also made “drug offenders
with minor criminal records eligible for the safety valve provision, which previously applied
only to offenders with virtually spotless criminal records” (James, 2020, p. 9). This
compassionate release provision allowed inmates to appeal the release decisions or refusals to
acknowledge a release request. Notably, the First Step Act applied the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 retroactively, allowing prisoners to petition the court to reduce sentences for crack cocaine
offenses (Gotsch, 2019). Despite bipartisan support, the program had mixed results one year
later, as judges approved sentence reductions, but the Department of Justice attempted “to block
hundreds of eligible beneficiaries” (para. 2). Increasing access to rehabilitative programs,
removing mandatory minimums, compassionate release, and retroactive application will remain
important issues to any federal drug policy, but prohibition is the root of the problem. As the
public increasingly favors leniency, demands for other drug and criminal justice policy changes
will surge as well.
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Chapter Two
Political elites have sought to manipulate public opinion in their favor throughout the
history of politics, and rhetoric from the War on Drugs had various levels of success. This
chapter aims to analyze the public’s response to different types of rhetoric and the factors that led
Americans to increase concern about drugs and increase consumption of cannabis
simultaneously. The chapter will also analyze the rise in acceptance of cannabis and drug users
more generally by the American public before moving to theories regarding the future of
marijuana politics in the United States.
Public Perceptions
Campaigns that sought to spike public concern about drug use and crime altered the
American psyche, leading to stricter penalization of drug possession, use, and distribution.
Gallup Trends (2020) analyzed responses to Gallup National Attitudes surveys and found that in
1989, 27% of respondents identified drugs and drug abuse as the nation’s most significant
concern. Concern declined after that, reaching single digits in 1992 and then rising again to 17%
in 1997. However, concern for drug use in the 21st century reached exceptionally low rates, with
less than 0.05% of respondents listing drugs as the biggest problem in the nation in 2020. Despite
this dramatic shift in public opinion, federal drug laws have changed very little, especially
regarding cannabis. Although public concern decreased, it became more challenging to justify
stricter drug policies. Still, the policies previously enacted at the federal level have proven longlasting as public attention moves to other issues.
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The public has grown increasingly open to the idea of marijuana legalization. In 1971, as
President Nixon announced the War on Drugs, another analysis of Gallup polls found that
approximately 12% of Americans supported the full legalization of marijuana (Jones, 2019). The
analysis also revealed that despite the War on Drugs’ height from 1980 to 1995 and the
subsequent rhetoric from President Reagan and President H. W. Bush regarding violent drug
users, around a quarter of Americans continued to support marijuana legalization. By the time
Colorado legalized recreational marijuana in 2012, 50% of Americans supported legalization.
After President Obama announced his administration would allow states to decide on the
cannabis issue and President Trump continued that practice, support skyrocketed. By 2019,
recreational marijuana use was legal in 10 states, and the number of Gallup respondents
supporting legalization had increased to 66%. As five additional states voted to legalize
recreational marijuana in November 2020, the number of Americans who supported the
legalization of cannabis reached an all-time high of 68% (Brenan, 2020a). The relationship
between public opinion and public policy cycled, with rhetoric usually driving concern. Figure 1
illustrates the shift in public support for cannabis legalization over this time period.

Figure 1: Public Opinion of Marijuana Legalization Over Time, 1970-2020.
Source: Brenan, 2020a; Jones, 2019
14

As the drug became more widespread and information became more readily available
through the Internet, public opinion began moving policy. 13 of the states who have legalized
recreational marijuana have done so through ballot initiatives, illustrating the power of public
opinion in cannabis policy today. Throughout the War on Drugs, public opinion followed
politicians’ rhetoric, while the criminalization strategy became self-fulfilling as Congress
enacted stricter laws. Nevertheless, as America prepares to move forward, public opinion and
citizen activism now often move cannabis policy directly, leaving policymakers behind.
Today, with several states functioning as experiments for the legalization issue, the public
generally supports legalization in some form. In 2019, 91% of U.S. adults supported the
legalization of medical marijuana (Daniller, 2019). Despite this, out of the 20 states that have
only legalized medical marijuana, 14 have legalized it through their state legislatures. Only six
have legalized through ballot initiatives. Another survey suggests 70% of American adults
believe smoking marijuana is morally acceptable, while only 28% believe it is morally wrong
(Brenan, 2020b). Nevertheless, marijuana remains a Schedule I substance under federal law. The
states that have legalized cannabis have been able to do so because President Obama’s
administration announced that the federal government would not interfere with state cannabis
laws. Presidents Trump and Biden continued that practice. Even so, in many states, people face
arrest and incarceration daily for marijuana offenses. Public opinion may have dramatic shifts,
but public policy can be slow to follow.
While most Americans believe the federal government should legalize cannabis, partisan
differences remain an ongoing issue. Bipartisan policymakers created some of the most
significant legislation punishing cannabis users. Still, Republican presidents, notably President
Nixon and President Reagan, have traditionally utilized heavy rhetoric to turn the public against
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marijuana and other drugs and their users. Figure 2 depicts a 2020 analysis of poll responses that
revealed 83% of Democrats felt marijuana should be legal, and 16% of Democrats thought it
should be illegal (Brenan, 2020a). On the other hand, 48% of Republicans said the use of
marijuana should be legal, and 52% of Republicans said it should be illegal. The generational
opinion gap remains but not as divided as the partisan gap. 79% of respondents ages 18-29 felt
marijuana should be legal, while only 55% of respondents over 65 agreed (Brenan, 2020a).
Given that older Americans tend to hold more conservative views and that they lived through the
height of the War on Drugs as teenagers to young adults, the generational divide could feed into
the partisan one. Despite marijuana’s Schedule I status, public support for the drug continues to
increase exponentially, particularly for medical use, but also for recreational use across party
lines, if not generations.

Figure 2: Public Opinion on Marijuana Legalization by Party Affiliation, 2020.
Source: Brenan, 2020a

One primary concern with marijuana legalization remains the possibility that youth rates
of consumption could increase, illustrated by the public’s fear of youthful delinquency that
16

developed throughout the war on drugs and led to the implementation of many school drug
education programs. The consumption of cannabis by adolescents has remained relatively stable
since the 1990s, despite more permissive marijuana legislation (CDC, 2017). The perceived ease
of access to the drug from youth has declined over the years. Survey responses show a “27%
overall reduction in the relative proportion of adolescents ages 12–17—and a 42% reduction
among youth ages 12–14—reporting that it would be very easy to obtain marijuana” between
2002 and 2015 (Salas-Wright et al., 2017, p. 777). Additionally, Salas-Wright (2017) found a
significant increase in the number of “adolescents who felt it would be probably impossible to
obtain marijuana” (p.778). The perceived harmfulness of cannabis by American youth has also
declined since 1991, but “younger adolescents in states that pass medical marijuana laws have a
lower overall decrease in perceived harmfulness than adolescents in states without medical
marijuana laws” (Keyes et al., 2016, p. 2192). Even in states with medical marijuana laws,
studies suggest little change in older adolescent attitudes and a trend of decreased perceived
accessibility for younger adolescents. If adolescents still perceive cannabis as somewhat, if
decreasingly, harmful and believe they would have difficulty obtaining it, the question now
becomes how dangerous the American voters believe the drug is and how best to communicate
risks to both young and old Americans.
Adolescents, as well as Americans on average, have grown less likely to perceive
cannabis as a harmful drug. Still, adults have lost fear at a much more rapid pace than the
American youth. Figure 3 illustrates survey results from 2002, which indicated that over 37% of
Americans said that there was “great risk” in smoking marijuana once a month, and just over
27% of respondents said there was “moderate risk,” while under ten percent said there was “no
risk” (SAMHDA, 2002). However, after a period of increased liberalization of marijuana laws,
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Americans increasingly view marijuana as less harmful. In 2019, 23% of Americans still
believed there was a “great risk” to smoking marijuana once a month (SAMHDA, 2019). Under
20% of respondents said there was “moderate risk,” and around 25% of respondents believed
there was “no risk” to smoking marijuana (SAMHDA, 2019). Even as states have legalized
medical and recreational marijuana and public opinion has shifted dramatically in favor of
legalization, Americans remain somewhat aware of potential risks.

Figure 3: Public Perception of Risk in Smoking Marijuana Once a Month, 2002
vs.2019. Source: SAMHDA, 2002, 2019

American public opinion has also become more liberal throughout the years concerning
punishments for drug offenders. For instance, Americans overwhelmingly do not support jail
time for possession of small amounts of cannabis. Doherty et al. (2014) found that 76% of survey
respondents in 2014 said that offenders should face no jail time for minor possession of
marijuana, as opposed to 22% of respondents that believe they should face jail time. The public
also supports less punitive punishments for drug users as a whole. The analysis also found that
support for repealing mandatory sentences for non-violent drug offenders rose from 47% in 2001
18

to 63% in 2014. Americans also favor treatment over punishment. In that same survey, 67% of
respondents said that the government should focus more on providing drug offenders treatment.
In comparison, 26% of respondents said they should focus more on prosecuting drug users, and
seven percent said they do not know. Public opinion moved through “rising levels of
punitiveness from the mid-1960s into the 1990s,” but support has declined since then for “tough
on crime” policies (Enns, 2014, p. 862). As fears have subsided, the public has grown
increasingly sympathetic to drug users, especially those who use cannabis.
Political Issues
The War on Drugs’ rhetoric helped change the public opinion of drugs from a minor
problem to a significant national issue quickly. Politicians reached these heights of concern by
associating drugs with delinquency, crime, and danger. Using fear-based rhetoric, political
leaders could move the conversation to drug abuse so that when public concern reached high
enough levels, they could institute stricter penalties for drug users and traffickers. By associating
marijuana with other Schedule I drugs, politicians demonized the drug and instilled fear in the
public. Rhetoric made the issue salient, and salience helped policymakers make the drug
immoral and illegal. Once the public became concerned about drug abuse, they needed someone
to deal with the issue. Nixon’s “law and order” strategy sought to fill this gap.
Real representative democracy requires that the government’s policies follow the public
opinion because if representatives do not perform well, citizens will vote them out. For many
states that have legalized recreational marijuana, public opinion has undoubtedly driven policy as
the public proposed and voted for those ballot initiatives. Even in states whose legislatures
passed recreational marijuana, and especially in states whose legislatures passed medical
marijuana laws, the legislature appeared to follow public opinion on the issue. This interaction
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underlies democratic theory, and yet, at the federal level, laws regarding cannabis have remained
mostly unchanged despite dramatic shifts in public opinion. Representative democracy requires
that the public vote out elected officials who do not perform in the way they expect or desire.
Marijuana legalization, however, has failed to gain the saliency necessary to move voters on a
large scale.
According to elite persuasion theory, political elites who present arguments to the public
and build campaigns on specific issues can set the American public’s agenda and direct their
constituents toward their position. Research shows that elite persuasion can prove so effective
that some voters do not even need to hear politicians make arguments to adopt their
representatives’ positions. Research suggests that policymakers “can shape constituents' views
on issues by merely staking out their positions on issues” (Broockman & Butler, 2017, p. 218).
With multiple public campaigns about the dangers of drugs in general and cannabis specifically,
the presidents and policymakers who served during the beginning and height of the drug war
successfully moved public opinion, allowing for significantly more punitive policies that have
proved difficult to change. The political leaders of the time changed the laws by setting drugs
high on the public agenda but moving cannabis alone up the ladder of issues on the agenda has
proved a much more difficult task.
Policymakers at the federal level currently have little motivation to move on marijuana
policy because while the public overwhelmingly supports marijuana, lukewarm support does not
produce voters’ action. Voters do not consider the illegality of marijuana a top problem facing
this country, at least not in the way they did drugs and crime when the current policies began.
Federally legalizing and regulating the substance can alleviate some of the burdens these issues
take on Americans every day. Still, the matter lacks the salience to drive a campaign.
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Marijuana remains a politically risky issue to campaign on because it lacks saliency. By
making the communication forefront focus on other major political issues and adding cannabis to
that strategy, the already publicly accepted policy change can become politically feasible. By
informing voters of how cannabis links to systemic racism, healthcare, the economy, and
freedom, supporters of legalization can push for changing votes because of the larger issues at
hand that relate. Supporters of medical marijuana exist across the aisle, and the younger
generations of voters overwhelmingly support the legalization of cannabis. The topic alone
cannot change votes, but by beginning with other bipartisan issues, such as data collection,
research, and medical marijuana access, supporters of recreational marijuana can motivate voters
for incremental change (Broockman & Butler, 2017; Daniller, 2019; Doherty et al., 2014).
After the election of November 2020, significant changes occurred to the state of
marijuana politics in America. Five states presented seven ballot measures to the people, and
four of those states legalized recreational marijuana while one legalized medical marijuana
(Goins, 2020). Every cannabis-related initiative on the ballot in 2020 passed. Arizona and New
Jersey legalized recreational marijuana on top of their existing medical marijuana program.
Montana legalized recreational marijuana through the passage of two separate ballot measures.
Mississippi legalized marijuana for medical use. South Dakota legalized cannabis in medical and
recreational settings in two different ballot measures. American citizens overwhelmingly favor
legalization, as shown in the public opinion surveys they complete and their votes at each
opportunity.
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Chapter Three
The shift in American public opinion regarding cannabis was reflected by and reflective
of a significant shift in state level policies which increasingly contradict federal law. The first
section of this chapter discusses the reactions of each branch of the federal government to this
shift. The analysis then moves to state medical marijuana programs and the strengths and
weaknesses prevalent within, followed by a parallel analysis of state recreational marijuana
programs.
Changing Landscape
While states took the lead on cannabis policy, the federal government resisted potential
changes. The legislature remained mostly stagnant for 50 years regarding the drug. During this
time, the Court deferred to Congress on cannabis laws and upheld the Controlled Substances Act.
Since the Obama administration, the executive branch has ignored the issue, allowing the states
to choose their marijuana policy and enforcing federal policy accordingly. Since California
became the first state to legalize the use of medical marijuana, the variety of approaches to
handling the drug within the United States has expanded to include widespread medical and
recreational legalization. Under American federalism, states can serve as “laboratories of
democracy,” as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis described the process by which states can
attempt changes in policy as experiments for other states to understand political ramifications of
the changes (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 1932). In the case under which the term became
popularized, the Court clarifies that a state may not use a political experiment as reasoning for
overriding the Constitution. As in this case and countless other cases, the Supremacy Clause, the
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clause in the U.S. Constitution that makes the Constitution and the laws of the United States the
supreme law of the land (Hames & Ekern, 2019, p. 23) typically prevents states from
implementing policies contrary to federal law, even if they intend to use it as an experiment.
Nevertheless, medical and recreational marijuana programs continue to function mostly
unchallenged within the United States (Pacula & Smart, 2019).
After Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, they virtually ceased
legislation regarding cannabis specifically. As states continued to legalize cannabis in both
medical and recreational settings and to experiment with different regulatory options, questions
arose about the legality of these state laws, given that Congress made no changes to federal
marijuana policy.
According to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and subsequent judicial
interpretations, when federal and state laws contradict each other, federal law usually takes
precedence (Hames & Ekern, 2019, p. 23). Despite this general rule, functioning state marijuana
programs remain unchallenged. Legal arguments regarding the constraints of federal preemption
and the retention of state police powers could explain the lack of federal action regarding the
ever-increasing gap between federal and state cannabis laws. Still, it has been politically
unpopular to challenge state laws, even though federal commerce powers have successfully done
so. By the time Colorado became the first state to legalize recreational marijuana, almost half of
American adults believed the government should legalize recreational marijuana (Jones, 2019).
In addition, cannabis advocates have developed talking points to appeal to voters of all political
ideologies: state sovereignty, economic growth, personal liberty, medicinal use, mass
incarceration, and more. For many Congress members, actively opposing and working against
the increasing number of states legalizing some form of cannabis use could pose a serious
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political risk. Nevertheless, working to change the status quo on cannabis legislation also holds
political risks because the older generation remains the most likely to vote and the least likely to
support marijuana legalization.
Congress’s tradition of inaction continued until December 2020, when the House of
Representatives voted to decriminalize cannabis federally. The Marijuana Opportunity
Reinvestment and Expungement (MORE) Act “would remove marijuana from the national list of
scheduled substances and eliminate federal criminal penalties for individuals who possess,
manufacture or distribute the drug, effectively leaving states to decide marijuana’s lawfulness”
(Porterfield, 2020, para. 2). Analysts predict that the Senate will not pursue the issue during the
current session, but 66% of Americans approved of the act as of December 2020 (Porterfield,
2020; Easley, 2020). Whether the action moves through Congress, the vote made history as “the
first time either chamber of Congress had ever endorsed the legalization of cannabis”
(Edmonson, 2020, para. 2). After decades of inaction, the broad nature of the first proposed
federal resolution to the discrepancy between federal and state law signals a possibility for
federal legalization in the future through legislative action.
While more states began to reject federal legislation on cannabis, the judiciary responded
in Gonzales v. Raich (2005) by acknowledging the federal government’s authority over the states
regarding medical marijuana programs (Rosenbaum, 2005). After California legalized marijuana
for medical use, the Clinton administration began the now-standard practice of avoiding
enforcement in states with functioning medical programs. As nine other states legalized medical
marijuana, the “Bush Administration adopted a contrary position that state law notwithstanding,
any personal possession of marijuana, even for medical reasons and without any evidence of sale
or commercial purposes, amounted to a criminal violation of the Controlled Substances Act”
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(Rosenbaum, 2005, p. 680). Following this shift in federal enforcement policy, agents raided the
home of a California medical marijuana patient, seizing plants grown for personal use.
Arguments before the Supreme Court centered around the federal government’s right to regulate
cannabis grown for personal use under the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the right to
regulate interstate commerce. Despite the Court’s recent preference for a more limited
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the majority held that “the California medical use law
was in direct conflict with the terms of the CSA and thus fell under principles of preemption”
(Rosenbaum, 2005, p. 681). Thus, the case essentially upheld the Constitutionality of the
Controlled Substances Act and reinforced the traditional view of federal supremacy, even in the
absence of police powers. Since then, the Court has declined to hear cases regarding marijuana
policies in any form, deferring to Congress regarding the legality of cannabis. After President
George W. Bush’s administration, the federal government largely avoided enforcement of laws
restricting marijuana possession in states with medical marijuana policies. Even with the Court’s
clear ruling that the Controlled Substances Act reigned supreme, states continued to legalize
cannabis for medical use and eventually for recreational use as well.
President Obama’s administration refrained from enforcing laws regarding cannabis in
states with functioning programs, but the system remained informal and unsettled as state laws
increasingly diverged from federal law. In 2013, one year after Colorado became the first state to
legalize recreational marijuana, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum written by
Deputy Attorney General James Cole. The memo explained that states which operated regulatory
marijuana programs “were promised that the federal government would not seek to eliminate
recreational marijuana markets wholesale” (Hansen et al., 2020, p. 3). This announcement did
not alter federal law, but like President Obama’s prior statements, it solidified the hands-off
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approach that the executive branch has followed since that time. In 2018, the Department of
Justice under President Trump’s administration issued a memorandum in which Attorney
General Jefferson Sessions announced that “previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana
enforcement is unnecessary and is rescinded” (Sessions, 2018, para. 3). Despite this rhetorical
move away from the hands-off approach of the previous administration, the “Trump Justice
Department has largely adhered to the Obama Administration’s enforcement priorities”
(Firestone, 2020, para. 1). With the executive branch allowing businesses and individuals to
comply with state law and avoid any federal penalties for doing so, states worked out policy
alternatives and regulatory options on their own.
Existing medical marijuana and recreational marijuana laws within the states can serve as
blueprints for plans while Congress reluctantly shifts in the other direction. The Supreme Court
and Executive Branch remain unlikely avenues for federal change because of the separation of
powers within the United States. Congress creates the laws, and it classified marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, with political encouragement from the executive branch. Nevertheless, the
legislative branch signaled potential change with the MORE Act, following the states that have
already paved the way.
State Medical Marijuana Policies
The use of cannabis for its medicinal properties has existed for millennia. Still, most
leading public health organizations have publicly refused to endorse medical marijuana or
condemn programs, citing the need for more research. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has also not approved cannabis for any official medical treatment. In 1985, however, the FDA
did approve the drug Marinol, which contains THC, the “psychoactive intoxicating component of
cannabis,” for cancer and AIDS patients (FDA, 2020, para. 4). Despite this approval of THC, in
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2006, the FDA released “an interagency advisory restating the federal government’s position that
‘smoked marijuana is harmful’ and the FDA has not approved the drug ‘for any condition or
disease indication,’” based on “past evaluation” (Eddy, 2010, p. 10). In 2017, the FDA approved
another drug containing THC for the same patients as those who qualified for Marinol (FDA,
2020). Epidiolex, a drug containing CBD but lacking THC, made history in 2018 as the first
cannabis-derived drug approved by the FDA to treat epilepsy in adults and children over the age
of two (FDA, 2020). Even with conflicting information, the public’s support for medical
cannabis has grown to almost unanimous levels as states implemented programs and tested
boundaries with marijuana regulations.
Notably, both the political propaganda and the law framed marijuana as having no
medical usage since Congress classified the drug in 1970, even as President Nixon’s First
Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse acknowledged marijuana’s potential for medical
use. Federal restrictions have also stunted research regarding the safety and effectiveness of the
drug. Despite these setbacks, existing literature and recent steps forward in drug approvals offer
promising potential. As research and policy continue to develop, the national political landscape
has changed rapidly as well. In 2018, former Republican Speaker of the House, John Boehner,
announced that he believes “descheduling the drug is needed so that we can do research and
allow VA to offer it as a treatment option in the fight against the opioid epidemic that is ravaging
our communities” (Horton & Ingraham, 2018, para. 8). As leaders and citizens on both sides of
the aisle have increased their support for cannabis at different rates, particularly in the medical
realm, policies implemented across the United States also developed to use and regulate the drug
differently.
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Ballot initiatives remain a popular method of approving both medical and recreational
marijuana programs. Citizens passed “seven of the first eight medical marijuana laws” this way
(Mallinson & Hannah, 2020, p. 353). As legislators began to realize the popularity of medical
marijuana programs and the potential for direct democracy’s success, legislative action became a
more politically feasible option for approving medical marijuana programs. Still, ballot
initiatives continue to serve as an opportunity to successfully adopt programs by the people in
more traditionally conservative states, where legislatures have tended to hesitate on the issue.
Early medical marijuana programs varied in every aspect, from the amount of cannabis a
patient could possess, how the patient could obtain cannabis, to the conditions that made one
qualify for medical marijuana as a treatment. Eddy (2010) analyzes these differences, noting that
California, the first state to legalize cannabis in a medical setting, required “a written or oral
recommendation” by a physician for “the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain,
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief”
(p. 19). Oregon’s original medical marijuana program, on the other hand, required that
“physicians advise that marijuana ‘may’ mitigate the symptoms or effects of a debilitating
condition” while allowing patients to cultivate their cannabis instead of providing for legal
distribution processes (p. 20). Alaska created a “mandatory state registry for medical cannabis
users” (p. 20). California, Oregon, and Alaska have expanded their medical marijuana programs
at differing rates to include more conditions and alter some regulations before eventually
transitioning to recreational programs. A patchwork of rules comprises the drug’s political
landscape, from the first states to legalize medical marijuana to the states which have done so
within the past year.
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This variance appears mostly because the legislation’s wording serves a crucial role in
maintaining the balance between state medical marijuana programs and the federal government’s
enforcement arm. Complications with federal law halted Arizona’s original medical marijuana
program because the 1996 law permitted patients to possess marijuana with a prescription, but
“federal law prohibits doctors from prescribing marijuana,” creating legal and political barriers
to implementing the program (Eddy, 2010, p. 22). The state later legalized medical marijuana in
2010 by a narrow margin before legalizing recreational use in 2020. With so many states
continually updating and changing their laws, medical marijuana programs in the United States
have tested many different methods of regulating the drug, with varying levels of success,
lending knowledge to each other along the way.
Medical marijuana laws serve several purposes for the states which choose to implement
them. These programs seek to provide patients with more treatment options and remove
employment barriers for patients who choose to use medical marijuana, but without federal
support they often fail to do so adequately (Pacula & Smart, 2017). Secondary goals of medical
marijuana proponents include mitigating both the harm caused by the War on Drugs and the
potential harm caused by illicit or excessive cannabis use by increasing research on the drug
(Eddy, 2010). Along these lines, proponents of medical marijuana policies have a broad range of
goals for the policy, making it somewhat difficult to measure the policy’s ability to meet said
goals. Regarding treatment options, medical marijuana laws succeed in their primary purpose of
providing another opportunity for patients, but depending on the state and its program, a patient
who would qualify for medical marijuana in one state may not in another (Eddy, 2010).
Additionally, the lack of research due to federal restrictions make expanding medical access
difficult (Pacula & Smart, 2017). Varying policies can lead to questions of equity between
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citizens of different states. Some have access to treatment options that others do not without the
federal government reconsidering the scheduling of marijuana.
Crime and incarceration remain essential topics of discussion with any level of cannabis
policy. For states that have enacted medical marijuana, studies suggest that “even heavy medical
marijuana use has a negligible effect on criminality” (Chu & Townsend, 2019, p. 517). Without
any evidence to suggest a statistically significant increase in violent or property crime, “the
liberalization of marijuana laws is unlikely to result in a substantial social cost from a surge in
crime” (Chu & Townsend, 2019, p. 517). Medical marijuana laws typically do not affect
incarceration rates, with only one state operating solely a medical marijuana program adding an
automatic expungement process, making the vast majority of programs ineffective at addressing
the lasting inequality of the War on Drugs (NORML, 2020). While researchers have failed to
prove that medical marijuana laws significantly decrease crime, they also failed to prove that
they increase crime, despite the fear of crime and violence as the primary purpose of prohibiting
cannabis for medical or recreational use in 1970.
The lack of an increase in crime, however, serves as only one positive indicator of the
policies’ effectiveness at mitigating any potential harm caused by increases in cannabis use.
Other critical indicators include the rate of marijuana dependence or abuse within states with
medical marijuana laws and adolescent use rate. Opponents of medical marijuana argue medical
marijuana laws lead to increased availability and use of cannabis by adolescents and increased
dependency on the drug by adults. Literature investigating cannabis usage patterns after a state’s
passage of medical marijuana laws “suggests a potential association between medical marijuana
laws implementation and increased current marijuana use among adults aged 21 or above, but
not among adolescents and younger adults” (Wen et al., 2015, p. 71). Even as the country
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implements more medical and recreational programs, adolescents do not perceive an increase in
the availability of marijuana (Salas-Wright et al., 2017). Studies suggest that when states
implement medical marijuana laws, the number of adults using the substance increases slightly,
but children do not begin to use it more often. Even as adults use the drug at higher rates in states
with medical marijuana laws, studies have found that “marijuana abuse/dependence was not
more prevalent among marijuana users in these states” (Cerdá et al., 2012, p. 22). Total
prohibition of cannabis may decrease use slightly among adults. Still, research suggests that it
has little to no effect on adolescents or on marijuana dependence among adults when compared
to a medical marijuana program.
Overall, medical marijuana programs have limited scope and efficacy in accomplishing
the primary goals and potential reach of cannabis legislation. With medical marijuana laws,
qualifying patients have greater freedom to choose their medication. Still, said freedom remains
limited so long as the patient lives within a state where they may legally pursue the drug as a
treatment. The regulations surrounding qualifying treatments and manners of obtaining cannabis
mitigate most potential harm caused by illicit use or abuse of the drug. Despite successes in these
effectiveness measures, medical marijuana laws fail to assist those in prison for marijuana
offenses, even if they would now qualify for medical marijuana had their arrest occurred later in
the state’s legislative history.
Recreational Marijuana Policies
People have used cannabis as both a medicinal and recreational drug for millennia. Still,
the federal government only recognizes the drug for its recreational properties, as Schedule I
drugs, which by definition have no medical value. Despite marijuana’s federal status, public
policy has grown increasingly lenient as public approval increased and federally sponsored anti-

31

marijuana communications decreased. Use rates correlated with this shift, as “marijuana use in
the United States has risen steeply since 2005 throughout all age groups” (Kerr & Yu Ye, 2017,
p. 473). When public health communications focused on linking all drug users to crime and
cannabis was illegal for all uses in all states, research shows “a decline in use during the 1980s
and 1990s” (Kerr & Yu Ye, 2017, p. 478). However, research regarding whether the public’s
attitude toward marijuana or public policy led to this increase in cannabis use remains
inconclusive, as the two work together to produce rates higher than either would alone. Despite
inconclusive scientific evidence or any substantial change in federal policy, states and citizens
have entirely changed how they use, possess, cultivate, and distribute marijuana in America.
Recreational policies that Americans once viewed as radical ideas have become common,
without much resistance from the public or federal government.
As a political issue, the delicate nature of marijuana made grassroots campaigns for ballot
initiatives popular for medical marijuana. This method has proven even more popular among
recreational states, with 13 of the 17 states that have legalized cannabis through ballot initiatives.
President Obama chose to remain silent on the issue when the first two states to legalize
marijuana did so during his second campaign, likely because they did so through ballot
initiatives and because legal questions about the federal government’s role in marijuana laws
remained unclear at the time. Federal and state legislators divided fairly evenly across party lines
regarding recreational marijuana, unlike medical marijuana, and that divide has remained wide.
Even as 48% of Republicans and 83% of Democrats believed that the federal government should
legalize cannabis, only five Republican House members voted for the MORE Act, while six
Democrats voted against it (Walsh, 2020). Analysts do not expect the Senate to pass the MORE
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Act solely because of party line affiliations with the issue. Because of this divide, ballot
initiatives will likely remain a crucial part of recreational legalization.
In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize cannabis for
recreational use. Colorado did so through a ballot initiative for Amendment 64 to the state
constitution that removed all penalties for adults who possess marijuana and “requires the state to
establish a regulatory structure for retail marijuana” (Co. Const. amend. 64, 2013). Washington
passed Initiative 502, which “authorizes the state liquor control board to regulate and tax
marijuana for persons twenty-one years of age and older” (Wa. Initiative 502 §1, 2011). Each
chose different regulatory agencies to oversee the program and different licensing standards, but
each had similar regulations regarding sales, possession amount, driving under the influence, and
taxes. The Colorado state constitutional amendment lists the legislation’s primary goals as
“efficient use of law enforcement resources, enhancing revenue for public purposes, and
individual freedom” (Co. Const. art. XVIII, §16, 2013). The Washington Initiative sought to give
law enforcement time to focus on violent and property crimes, “generate new state and local tax
revenue,” and “take marijuana out of the hands of illegal drug organizations” (Wa. Initiative 502
§1, 2011). Both pieces of legislation describe the new manner of regulating marijuana
consumption, possession, and distribution within their state as akin to alcohol regulation,
illustrating the radical shift in public opinion as voters increasingly view the two drugs similarly.
While ballot initiatives remain the most successful method of legalizing recreational
cannabis, the sweeping changes and often tight time constraints placed on state legislatures and
state agencies have produced disorganized starts for recreational programs legalized in this way.
In the first several states that adopted recreational marijuana policies, regulatory issues regarding
a broad range of agencies and public issues arose quickly. In Colorado, the program has
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coordinated efforts between experts in “public and environmental health, transportation, human
services (which includes child protective services and behavioral health), health care coverage
and access, public safety and law enforcement, revenue, and education” (Ghosh et al., 2016, p.
21). To track, report, and produce solutions for many issues that have arisen with recreational
marijuana legalization, state agencies must maintain high collaboration levels. While state
agencies have attempted to achieve the needed level of cooperation, “data collection and analysis
has not kept pace with the booming industry cannabis” (Yates & Speer, 2018, p. 63). Like many
markets that would follow Colorado, the hurried nature of ballot initiative programs and lack of
federal infrastructure weakened the program’s organizational success and limited data collection
in other areas necessary for proper policy analysis.
Six years after Colorado’s citizens voted to legalize recreational marijuana, the Colorado
Department of Public Safety released a report studying the change’s impact. The report notes
that “it is difficult to draw conclusions about the potential effects of marijuana legalization and
commercialization on public safety, public health, or youth outcomes, and this may always be
the case due to the lack of historical data” (Colorado Department of Public Safety, 2018, p.1).
Despite these limitations, the data serves as a starting point for growth and improvement within
Colorado’s recreational marijuana program. Between 2012 and 2017, marijuana-related arrests
decreased as expected, but black people within the state still faced a marijuana arrest rate of
nearly double that of white people (Colorado Department of Public Safety, 2018). States must
ensure equitable enforcement of any cannabis policy to increase individual freedom and
reconcile damage done to communities of color through the War on Drugs.
In addition to disproportionate arrest rates in Colorado, in 2020, 75% of respondents
identified as dispensary owners in Colorado were white, while black respondents made up six
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percent of both owners and employees (Analytic Insight, 2020). However, the state does not
require retail marijuana license holders to provide personal data, so “these percentages should be
interpreted with caution” (Analytic Insight, 2020, p. 17). In response to equity concerns, the state
added “social equity licenses” and gave the governor authority to grant wide pardons for those
convicted of certain marijuana offenses in June 2020 (Awad, 2020). Eight years after Colorado’s
citizens legalized cannabis for recreational use, the communities most impacted by cannabis
prohibition began to see movement towards reconciliation, with results of these policies
remaining undetermined in the state’s saturated recreational marijuana industry.
In 2019, Illinois became the first state to legalize recreational marijuana markets through
the state legislature rather than through a ballot initiative and the Cannabis Regulation and Tax
Act. Despite the law having many similarities to previously enacted recreational programs, the
legislature had time to sort through some potential efficiency and equity issues before the bill
became law. The bill included responsibilities for multiple public agencies to regulate
advertising, packaging, quality control, and licensing functions. The law also allowed for a
Cannabis Regulation Oversight Officer in the Governor’s Office and a Community College
Cannabis Vocational Training Pilot Program. Additionally, Illinois addressed equity issues
resulting from the lasting effects of the War on Drugs in their initial recreational policy, rather
than later as select other jurisdictions have done. The law allowed for automatic expungements
for marijuana convictions that involved less than the now legally permissible amount. Owners of
cannabis dispensaries cannot receive federal loans, so Illinois also allowed for a low-interest loan
program for “qualified ‘social equity applicants’ to help defray the start-up costs associated”
with starting a cannabis business. Illinois designed the program to help communities that the War
on Drugs disproportionately impacted, but the delay allowed medical marijuana producers to
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have a head start in the industry (Schuba, 2020). Because of this delay, Illinois has “not a single
licensed marijuana business that counts a person of color as a majority owner,” despite the bill’s
language promoting equity (Schuba, 2020, para. 3). Illinois experienced a more organized rollout
of recreational marijuana than states that legalized it through ballot initiatives, but it ultimately
fell short of addressing equity issues surrounding cannabis.
Despite the various equity concerns that require further attention for new legislation to
begin the process of reconciling long-lasting damage from prohibition, research suggests that
fears of increasing rates of traffic incidents and fatalities due to legalization are unfounded.
Nationally, tests for the “presence of marijuana rose from 8.6% in 2007 to 12.6% in 2014” in
nighttime weekend drivers (Bloch, 2020, para. 1). Roadside tests for marijuana impairment have
relatively unreliable results, however, because “a high concentration may significantly impair
one person but not another,” and cannabis can “stay in the system for weeks, thus appearing in
roadside tests while no longer causing impairment” (Bloch, 2020, para. 2). These limitations
have led to various policies for driving under the influence of marijuana. Some states have
continued zero-tolerance policies for any level of cannabis in a person’s system while driving,
and some states have set per se testing limits that would indicate impairment. Still, other states,
namely Colorado, allow “drivers who are charged to introduce an affirmative defense to show
that despite having tested at or above the legal limit, they were not impaired” (Bloch, 2020, para.
7). Despite difficulty with testing drivers, legalization has had a negligible effect on traffic
fatalities. In Colorado and other states that have legalized recreational marijuana, “traffic
fatalities decreased following the institution of medical marijuana laws and increased following
legalization,” however that increase “lasted no more than a year, averaged an additional 1.1
fatalities per million, and mirrored changes in states without legalization” (Leyton, 2019, p. 291).
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Without evidence to show increasing fatalities but increasing rates of drivers testing positive for
cannabis in their systems, states will continue developing better testing mechanisms to determine
whether a driver is currently impaired. Current research suggests that the roads’ safety in states
with recreational marijuana remains mostly unchanged, as does the communities’ safety within
these states.
As noted in both Colorado’s and Washington’s laws, proponents of recreational policies
believed that “legalization would allow police agencies to prioritize other activities, which in
turn would increase clearance rates and reduce crime” (Makin et al., 2018, p. 47). Still, the
rhetoric from the War on Drugs connecting cannabis users with criminals lingered, contributing
to the early hesitation to legalization. Despite this theoretical connection, studies “suggest that
marijuana legalization and sales have had minimal to no effect on major crimes in Colorado or
Washington” (Lu et al., 2019, p. 1). Some research results from Colorado even suggest that “the
legalization of marijuana influenced police outcomes” (Makin et al., 2018, p. 47) and
demonstrate “significant crime reductions in neighborhoods that receive marijuana dispensaries”
(Brinkman & Mok-Lamme, 2019, p. 17). While the data remains limited and expanding,
preliminary studies do not support the link between criminality and cannabis usage referenced
frequently by politicians that led to the drug’s listing as Schedule I in the Controlled Substances
Act.
While researchers have not linked recreational marijuana policies to the severe public
health and safety outcomes that opponents of the measures and federal policy suggested that they
may, the programs have had demonstrably positive effects on the economies of the states which
have enacted the policies. States that have legalized have collected substantial and increasing tax
revenue from the marijuana industry, and unemployment rates remain low as the industry brings
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jobs to these areas. By November 2020, Colorado had earned $355,097,017 in marijuana tax
revenue for that year and a total of $1,563,063,859 since 2014, when the program began
functioning (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2020). The state funnels these taxes into the
state’s marijuana tax fund, which funds health care, substance abuse prevention and treatment
programs, public health initiatives, law enforcement, public school initiatives, and general
legislative funds. In addition to raising state tax revenue substantially, recreational marijuana and
the spillover effects of the policy exacerbated by marijuana tourism have brought jobs and
businesses to the state. By measuring both direct and indirect impacts of cannabis on the
economy, researchers estimate that “in 2015, the legal marijuana industry in Colorado created
more than 18,000 new full-time jobs and generated $2.4 billion in economic activity” (Ingraham,
2016, para. 1). Without proven adverse effects on society, the positive impact on freedom and
the economy has led to a boom of states legalizing cannabis.
In November 2020, South Dakota made history as the first state to legalize cannabis for
both medical and recreational purposes simultaneously through ballot initiatives. Despite
opposition from the state’s governor and legislature, the measure for “medical passed with
seventy percent, and it was about fifty-three percent for recreational” (Kolpack, 2020, para. 7).
Most of the South Dakota law provisions echoed restrictions made by other states that had
success in other states. It gave the State Department of Revenue the responsibility to “license and
regulate the cultivation, manufacture, testing, transport, delivery, and sale of marijuana in the
state and to administer and enforce this article” (Ravnsborg, 2020, p. 4). In addition, the bill gave
the state legislature through 2022 to create fully-functional recreational and medical marijuana
programs. The bill lacked provisions requiring public health and safety data collection, but the
legislature will likely assign those functions later. It remains unknown whether states will

38

manage to reliably track their recreational marijuana programs’ successes and failures, especially
considering the difficulties in obtaining accurate historical data for comparison. Without rigorous
state budget considerations for data collection and analysis specifically or federal infrastructure
to require and collect data, some aspects of marijuana legalization remain unclear.
Despite the limited nature of the literature on the overall effects of legalizing cannabis for
recreational purposes, marijuana legalization increases in popularity in the United States. Oregon
has also decriminalized possession of small amounts of street drugs “including heroin, cocaine,
methamphetamine, ecstasy, LSD, psilocybin, methadone and oxycodone” (Crombie, 2020, para.
16) and legalizing “regulated use of psychedelic mushrooms in a therapeutic setting” for adults
(Acker, 2020, para. 4). Both policies passed through ballot initiatives, Measure 109 and Measure
110, in November 2020. In legalizing psychedelic mushrooms, the state did not place them on
the same level as their recreational marijuana program; instead, Measure 109 requires
“psilocybin to be stored and administered at licensed facilities” (Acker, 2020, para. 10).
Additionally, while Oregon has now decriminalized many drugs through Measure 110,
possession of them remains a civil infraction, similar to a traffic infraction, carrying a fine, or the
choice of substance abuse screening (Crombie, 2020). Measure 110 also reduces punishments for
felony drug possession cases to misdemeanor status and “funnels millions in marijuana tax
revenue toward what it calls Addiction Recovery Centers,” establishing a fund for “treatment,
housing or other programs designed to address addiction” (Crombie, 2020, para. 18). While these
measures may prove to achieve their goals of decreasing inequality and incarceration while
maintaining or decreasing drug abuse rates, they also demonstrate the extent to which the public,
particularly in Oregon, has changed their views on drugs and drug offenders.
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Medical marijuana laws fall short in the same arena that currently enacted state
recreational marijuana laws also fail, albeit not as severely. The War on Drugs decimated
communities, and unfortunately, those impacted even only through marijuana-related issues still
struggle to gain equal footing in medical and recreational states (Colorado Department of Public
Safety, 2018; NORML, 2020). Automatic expungements for marijuana-related crimes continue
to become more common, but federal offenders in these communities still face collateral
consequences (Il. H.B. 1438). States have failed to support communities of color to the extent
necessary to begin to mitigate the harm done to them, as white people overwhelmingly benefit
more financially from medical and recreational marijuana laws (Analytic Insight, 2020; Schuba,
2020). State-by-state marijuana policies will never accomplish their goal of equitable treatment
regarding cannabis entirely. The collateral damage from years of strict prohibition on a federal
and state level requires both federal and state resources to solve (Thompson, 2017; Lampe,
2021). Also, obtaining complete and accurate data and analysis regarding the effects of
legalization and the efficiency and effectiveness of different types of regulations will likely
require federal infrastructure and funding (NASEM, 2017). Research into better testing methods
for impairment and analysis into cannabis’s health and safety, in all forms, also needs federal
funding (Lampe, 2021). Despite these drawbacks, recreational marijuana laws can increase
equality, freedom, financial security for the state, and the number of other crimes that police can
solve if appropriately implemented and tracked (Colorado Department of Public Safety, 2018;
Colorado Department of Revenue, 2020; Ingraham, 2016; Makin et al., 2018).
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Chapter Four
The following chapter looks to the future of marijuana politics in the United States,
arguing that states require federal intervention for their medical and recreational marijuana
policies to function adequately. The first section addresses the areas in which intervention is
most needed. The second section analyzes previous political rhetoric and communication tactics,
while the third discusses the reality of cannabis use and scientific understanding both during the
time of the rhetoric and today as a result of it. Finally, the chapter proposes an ideal federal
policy to comprehensively address weaknesses in state programs and the MORE Act in
implementation, racial justice, automatic expungements, collateral consequences, data collection,
research supply, research funding, and communication.
Federal Intervention Needed
According to limited data from states that have legalized, the legalization of recreational
marijuana brought about no substantial negative societal impacts. Patients experience greater
freedom of choice when deciding to use cannabis as an experimental treatment. Police have more
time to focus on other crimes, resulting in higher clearance rates (Makin et al., 2018). Though
drivers increasingly test positive for marijuana on the road, positive tests do not always indicate
active impairment, and traffic fatalities remain relatively stable (Bloch, 2020). Research suggests
no increase in major crimes for states with recreational marijuana, and even a possible crime rate
decrease in neighborhoods with dispensaries (Brinkman & Mok-Lamme, 2019; Lu et al., 2019;
Makin et al., 2018). The number of adults in the United States who use cannabis has increased
slightly, but the number of youths using the drug nationally has decreased somewhat since states
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began legalization (CDC, 2017). Recreational marijuana has also contributed to large increases
in tax revenue, substantial business opportunities, and an influx of employment opportunities in
states that have legalized it (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2020, Ingraham, 2016).
Stakeholders in states that have legalized recreational marijuana generally consider these
programs successful.
Despite the successes these programs have experienced in criminal justice and economic
outcomes from recreational marijuana, most recreational states have failed to utilize their laws to
increase equality and responsibly move forward (Schuba, 2020; Analytic Insight, 2020). Without
federal funding and fewer scientific research restrictions regarding cannabis, States will continue
to regulate a product they do not fully understand. Research regarding alternative uses of
cannabis and different frequencies of cannabis use needs support, and it currently faces
significant barriers from the federal government (NASEM, 2017; Lampe, 2021). States also have
scattered data regarding the public concern, perception of harm, health incidents, traffic
incidents, criminal justice outcomes, and demographic information from people in the cannabis
industry (Analytic Insight, 2020; Colorado Department of Public Safety, 2018; Keyes et al.,
2016; Yates & Speer, 2018). The federal government has ignored a rapidly growing industry.
Communication strategies have been confusing to both adults and children about the risks and
benefits of consuming cannabis. States, individuals, and corporations have benefited
economically from recreational marijuana, but policies continue to exclude people of color from
benefitting, illustrating another need for federal intervention (Analytic Insight, 2020; Colorado
Department of Revenue, 2020; Ingraham, 2016; Schuba, 2020). Criminal justice outcomes
continue to disproportionately favor white defendants in all cases, including for marijuana
offenses, and neither state nor federal level reforms to only cannabis laws can address that

42

(ACLU, 2020). However, federal recreational marijuana laws can alleviate disparities in
outcomes in both the criminal justice system and the cannabis market.
States have attempted to address some of these failures, but most attempts have fallen
short of a solution. States are incapable of changing federal research procedures. Some have tried
to maintain accurate data collection to track the effects of legalization. Colorado added support
for businesses in suffering communities, but only after established medical marijuana providers
had saturated the market (Awad, 2020, Analytic Insight, 2020). Illinois provided a loophole for
established medical marijuana providers to get a head start in the recreational market (Schuba,
2020). Still, the state offered an automatic expungement process once the state legalized
recreational marijuana (The Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, 2019). Repairing damages done
by prohibition begins with federal support for affected communities, allowing for accurate
tracking, analysis, and understanding of the effects of state-by-state recreational marijuana
legalization. State programs have had successes, but their failures lie within the federal
government’s unwillingness to deviate from policies produced by the rhetoric from the War on
Drugs.
Previous Communications
In the early 1970s, along with President Nixon’s national campaign strategy, local
agencies and other groups promoted federal anti-drug propaganda efforts. Siff (2018) analyzed
this strategy, discovering that during this time, “pamphlets warning parents against the ‘evil’ and
‘menace’ of ‘unpredictable’ marijuana and stamped with the police department’s shield”
circulated in Los Angeles, with similar messages reaching communities across the country (pp.
184-185). Advertising agencies produced these public service announcements with haste,
resulting in materials that appeared poorly researched, leading officials to complain “that
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exaggerations in earlier anti-drug propaganda had, in effect, poisoned the well” (p. 185). After
the public rejected scare tactics and exaggeration, national advertisements became gentler, and
some even “acknowledged that common health fears about marijuana were unproven—but
marijuana possession was nonetheless a federal felony, and a conviction could ruin one’s future”
(p. 185). Messaging concerning the health effects of cannabis has rarely influenced individual
action, especially as messages conflict.
The Ad Council, which consisted of multiple government-sponsored advertising
agencies, decided to use the tagline, “Why Do You Think They Call It Dope?” to effectively
communicate the risks of marijuana to youth, as further explained by Siff (2018). The campaign
found that by using the term “dope” as “a broad-spectrum term for drugs, and in testing the
theme line with kids, the effect was excellent” (p. 204). President Nixon had a “very positive,
enthusiastic, and encouraging” reaction to this new campaign (p. 206). Because the Controlled
Substances Act classified the drugs featured together, the federal government’s message became
clear: marijuana is analogous to cocaine, heroin, and various pills. Conflicting advertisements
were displayed across the country, often full of misinformation. As a result, marijuana use
among young adults and teenagers grew while public concern also increased (Siff, 2018). If
President Nixon’s administration sought to reduce marijuana consumption by young Americans,
it failed miserably; however, if the campaign sought to lay the foundation for severe parental
paranoia and connect cannabis with criminality, it succeeded.
President Ford used a softer approach rhetorically but maintained President Nixon’s
policies. President Carter’s more lenient views on marijuana offenses never became policy.
President Reagan famously attacked Carter’s policies on the campaign trail, declaring that
“marijuana, pot, grass, whatever you want to call it, is probably the most dangerous drug in the
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United States and we haven't begun to find out all of the ill-effects. But they are permanent illeffects” (Aggarwal, 2013, para. 1). With younger generations rejecting the scare tactics and the
knowledge that his voting base increasingly associated marijuana use with criminality, the
Reagan administration created a campaign against drugs based on personal morality. Taking a
broad approach similar to the Nixon administration’s later communications, President Reagan’s
rhetoric blurred the lines between cannabis and other drugs using the tagline, “Just Say No”
(Aggarwal, 2013). By implying a national decay of morality, and with crime and drug use rates
spiking across the country, President Reagan offered individual morality as the solution to the
American people’s fears while heightening them at the same time. Reagan consistently
exaggerated medical evidence against cannabis throughout his presidency, ignoring
decriminalization arguments and insisting that severe drug abuse had spread into communities
across America. This strategy worked, leading to 27% of Americans listing drugs and drug abuse
as the most serious problem in America in 1989 (Gallup Trends, 2012). The broad nature of the
“Just Say No” campaign blurred lines between substances while blaming systemic failures on
individual responsibility, leading to permanent consequences for the country’s politics and
policies regarding marijuana.
President George H.W. Bush implemented policies against cannabis but rarely spoke
about the topic. On the other hand, Waxman (2017) notes that President Clinton once admitted to
smoking marijuana in England but famously said he “didn’t inhale” (para. 2). Despite this
admission, he championed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which
exacerbated the state of the War on Drugs. President George W. Bush also had a “wild lifestyle”
before entering politics and reportedly used cocaine during this time (para. 11). When asked
about marijuana, however, he avoided the question. According to a leaked audio recording, he
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said he did not want a kid to say, “President Bush tried marijuana, I think I will.” (para. 12).
Whether President Bush admitted to marijuana use, and even as his administration sought to
restrict the legalization of medical marijuana, President Clinton’s shy admission in 1992 altered
the status quo regarding presidents and public knowledge of drug use.
President Obama openly discussed his previous drug use in his second memoir, published
in 1995, two years before entering politics as an Illinois state senator. 24 years after he wrote that
“Pot had helped, and booze; maybe a little blow when you could afford it” (Waxman, 2017, para.
13) regarding his relationship with his father, he became President of the United States. President
Trump avoided the issue almost entirely, giving and taking lukewarm support from both sides
throughout his tenure. President Biden supported the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act as a Senator, often describing marijuana as a “gateway drug” before his
presidential run. However, on the campaign trail, he called for decriminalizing cannabis and
expunging records for those “convicted of anything having to do with marijuana possession or
use” (Angell, 2020, para. 16). While presidential rhetoric changed, public health communications
rarely reflected the shift, and reality rarely reflected the propaganda used to enact and maintain
long-lasting policies.
Reality
Despite the scare tactics and propaganda warning of addiction early in the War on Drugs,
the survey delivered to President Nixon revealed that 41% of adults and 45% of youth ages 12 to
17 “who have ever used marijuana reported that they no longer use the drug” (Shafer, 1972, pp.
40-41). While abuse of the drug remained rare, an increasing percentage of Americans tried
marijuana. During President Nixon’s first term, the number of Americans who said they had tried
marijuana at some point rose by eight percent (Robison, 2002). The public grew increasingly
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open to the liberalization of marijuana laws as experimentation among youth became more
popular, and scare tactics often viewed as exaggeration, especially with President Ford’s
softened rhetoric and President Carter’s acceptance.
In the 1980s, America experienced an increase in cocaine use and abuse, which
“contributed to the reaction against marijuana law reform and helped refocus the public dialogue
on bolstering drug law enforcement in general” (Slaughter, 1988, p. 442). Even as drug use
declined and leveled off in the mid-1980s, the public called for increased punishments for
offenders to protect American morality and youth from the drug (Slaughter, 1988). Just as the
rhetorical strategy employed by prior executive branches made few effects on youth
consumption rates, the criminalization strategy also failed to produce meaningful changes in
youth behavior. As the number of those arrested and incarcerated increased exponentially from
1990 to 2002, “daily use of marijuana by high school seniors nearly tripled from 2.2% to 6%,”
the same rate of use as high school seniors in 1975 (King & Mauer, 2006, p. 4). The rhetoric of
increasing demoralization during the War on Drugs created long-lasting policies that
increasingly incarcerated people of color, but the messaging failed to decrease drug use.
Cannabis use has increased in the United States since the early 2000s, particularly among states
with recreational and medical marijuana policies, but surveys estimate the usage range hovered
at 13.9% in 2016 (SAMHSA, 2017). Americans increasingly view the use of recreational
marijuana as akin to that of alcohol and tobacco. While public perception of cannabis use has
shifted drastically, the United States systematically incarcerates nonviolent marijuana offenders.
Relying on morality to criminalize cannabis users became the primary communication
strategy for President Reagan’s lasting “Just Say No” campaign and communications that
followed. Even the data presented to President Nixon by the Shafer Commission in 1972,
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however, “dismissed the theory that marijuana use caused violent crime and juvenile
delinquency,” as do modern studies regarding the effects of legalization (Brinkman and MokLamme, 2019; Lu et al., 2019; Makin et al., 2018; Slaughter, 1988, p. 423). Despite evidence
that violent crime does not correlate with cannabis use alone, President Nixon and his successors
continued to criminalize and demoralize marijuana offenders. The total number of arrests “by
local, state and federal law enforcement officers soared from 20,000 in 1965 to 190,000 in 1970
and doubled again to 421,000 by 1973” and remained above 400,000 into the mid-1980s
(Slaughter, 1988, pp. 420-421).
Even as America moved into a new era with the president who “didn’t inhale,” marijuana
and drug arrests continued to skyrocket. Data shows that from 1990 to 2002, “the total number of
marijuana arrests more than doubled from 327,000 to 697,000, an increase of 113%” (King and
Mauer, 2006, p. 3). While drug arrests in general increased by 41% nationally, “of the 450,000
increase in arrests for drugs, 82.4% was solely from marijuana arrests, and 78.7% from
marijuana possession arrests” (King and Mauer, 2006, p. 3). These arrest rates demonstrate that
while the War on Drugs’ propaganda succeeded in demoralizing and criminalizing drug users, it
failed to reduce drug use in America. Instead, “arrests have grown at a rapid rate while use
patterns fluctuate but remain near the same level” (King and Mauer, 2006, p. 4). Even though
two-thirds of the country supports legalization, “in 2018 alone, there were an estimated 692,965
marijuana arrests — the vast majority of which (89.6%) were for possession” (ACLU, 2020, p.
21). Between 2010 and 2018, marijuana arrests never dropped below 500,000 nationally (ACLU,
2020, p. 21). Americans continue to adapt to a new set of societal rules regarding marijuana,
marijuana offenders, and drug offenders generally, but the criminal justice system and federal
policy refuse to reflect the shift.
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By remaining in the past on cannabis policy, the federal government chooses to ignore
one of the harsh realities of racial disparity in the criminal justice system. Ehrlichman spoke
about the Nixon administration’s desire to criminalize and disenfranchise “the antiwar left and
black people,” (Baum, 2016, para. 2) and that desire has become a grim reality for black people
across America. During the 1990s, law enforcement often focused on “low-level marijuana
offenders,” which led to disproportionate policing of black communities, and this issue continues
to contribute heavily to large gaps in arrest rates for black and white people (ACLU, 2020, p. 43;
King & Mauer, 2006, p. 5).
Surveys by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration have shown
that black and white populations in America use cannabis at comparable rates, as illustrated by
Figure 4. 50.7% of white survey respondents had tried marijuana in their lifetime, as compared to
42.4% of black survey respondents (ACLU, 2020). Nevertheless, in 2018, black people were
3.64 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white people nationally, even
as arrests for marijuana possession have declined as a whole (ACLU, 2020, p. 29). Figure 5
illustrates the extent of this disparity from 2010 to 2018.Racial disparities also exist at many
other points in the criminal justice system for drug offenders, increasing the harm done to Black
and Latino communities by over-policing and criminalizing cannabis exponentially (ACLU,
2020; Omori, 2018). The culmination of these disparities results in “black men receiving drug
sentences that are 13.1 percent longer than sentences imposed for White men and Latinos being
nearly 6.5 times more likely to receive a Federal sentence for cannabis possession than nonHispanic Whites” (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). These disproportionate outcomes have
collateral consequences even after incarceration, furthering the damage done to communities of
color through prohibition.
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Figure 4: Usage of marijuana for ages 12+, 2018.
Source: ACLU, 2020

Figure 5: Marijuana possession rates per 100k by race, 2010-2018.
Source: ACLU, 2020.

The current state of extreme racial inequality under the criminal justice system requires a
level of change that legalizing recreational marijuana cannot accomplish, even if done on the
federal level. However, the federal government still has a responsibility to begin the process of
repairing communities of color. African American people face higher arrest and incarceration
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rates for marijuana-related offenses and once arrested, offenders face hurdles in the legal
cannabis industry. Legal cannabis markets “often include a ‘good moral character’ clause,”
which usually bars those with criminal records from seeking employment in the legal marijuana
industry (Thompson, 2017, p. 126). Marijuana offenses can also “limit individuals’ eligibility for
federal student financial aid and other benefits” (Lampe, 2021, p. 27). For those incarcerated for
marijuana offenses, very few states include automatic expungement processes. Others simply
expanded their policy to allow for a more straightforward expungement process, but that often
requires access to legal representation.
In the last decade, change to the United States’ drug policy has become increasingly
popular, as evidenced by the radical shift in state cannabis policies. On the national level, the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 diminished but did not eliminate the difference in crack and powder
cocaine sentencing guidelines. The First Step Act of 2018 applied that change retroactively,
allowed prisoners requesting compassionate release to appeal, reduced mandatory minimums,
and expanded their eligibility for release. Repairing the disparity caused by the prohibition of
cannabis begins with a uniform policy of automatic expungements and pardons applied
retroactively, but it does not end there.
Both medical and recreational marijuana have benefited the economies of the states that
have implemented the policies. In 2019, medical and recreational marijuana stores were a 13.6billion-dollar industry, and the medical and recreational marijuana growing industry collected
over 8.1 billion dollars in revenue (Fernandez, 2019a, Fernandez, 2019b). This revenue has
helped create jobs and generate tax income (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2020, Ingraham,
2016, Fernandez 2019a, Fernandez 2019b). States failed to produce an equitable cannabis market
where people of color can participate and profit, despite an overall benefit to the economy. In

51

Illinois, the delay in social equity programming has led to no cannabis businesses with a person
of color as a majority owner (Schuba, 2020). Also, the lack of mandatory reporting for these
businesses confuses the evaluation of social equity aspects of the bill. As the MORE Act notes,
“fewer than one-fifth of cannabis business owners identify as minorities and only approximately
4 percent are black” (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). Without federal intervention, this
industry will fail to seize an opportunity to help support the communities that have suffered the
most from the War on Drugs.
The cannabis industry has various data collection gaps, lacking standards in evaluating
the economic and social concerns and evaluating public health indicators and medical research.
Researchers studying cannabis products “must navigate a series of review processes that may
involve the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), institutional review boards, offices,
or departments in state government, state boards of medical examiners, the researcher's home
institution, and potential funders” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(NASEM), 2017, p. 378). The drug’s classification as Schedule I in 1970 resulted in these
enhanced security regulations. Today, they lead to less active research regarding the safety and
use of the most widely used drug in America. Researchers struggle to obtain both approval and
funding for general research that lacks a clear public health purpose, as “less than one-fifth of
cannabinoid research funded by NIDA in the fiscal year 2015 concerns the therapeutic properties
of cannabinoids” (NASEM, 2017, p. 382).
Suppose they obtain approval from all of the necessary government agencies. In that
case, cannabis researchers face a regulated supply chain, with all of the cannabis for research
funded by the NIDA, cultivated at the University of Mississippi, and often frozen for later
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analysis. This process results in a research product of a “lower potency than cannabis sold in
state-regulated markets” (NASEM, 2017, p. 383). Researchers also struggle to conduct studies
on alternative methods of consuming cannabis, such as edibles or waxes, because of the lack of
available federal sources. Federal law also “limits the use of federal funding for such research,”
excluding all Schedule I drugs unless “there is significant medical evidence of a therapeutic
advantage” or ongoing “federally sponsored clinical trials” researching said advantage (Lampe,
2021, p. 31). The complexity of obtaining marijuana for research purposes and the lack of federal
funding available to researchers for broader research on the drug’s therapeutic uses poses a
severe threat to our understanding of society’s effect by prohibition or legalization.
Ideal Strategy
Successful cannabis legalization can benefit researchers, business owners, communities
of color, taxpayers, state economies, recreational marijuana users, police departments, medical
marijuana patients, marijuana offenders, and society. Undeniably, the use of cannabis poses
some risk to individuals, but experiments of our democracy and others worldwide have failed to
produce evidence of risk to society as a whole. When drug use declined in the 1980s, the trend
reflected an underlying truth in Reagan’s rhetoric: marijuana was illegal, and one would likely
face incarceration for possession of the substance. Americans today understand a simple
underlying reality in the country’s myriad of regulations: even legal substances have risks, like
alcohol or tobacco, and cannabis has medical benefits as well.
Congress must legalize recreational marijuana. Prohibition has caused numerous adverse
outcomes for countless individuals, and America needs to take this small step toward repairing
the damage done by the War on Drugs. As more states legalize, recreational marijuana policies
increasingly positively impact the states’ economy and people. Over two-thirds of the country
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supports legalization, and only nine percent of Americans do not support medical marijuana
legalization (Daniller, 2019). The Senate has the opportunity to pass the MORE Act, but if the
bill fails as predicted, effective cannabis regulation will still require Congressional action. Since
2014, Congress has passed “an appropriations rider prohibiting DOJ from using taxpayer funds
to prevent states from implementing” medical marijuana programs annually. Still, they have not
addressed recreational programs (Lampe, 2021, p. 26). Fueled by executive rhetoric and rising
drug use, Congress chose to criminalize addicts, recreational users, and medical users alike.
Congress must fix the issue, but they have the opportunity to use state policies as blueprints and
to examine the most effective approaches available.
The MORE Act aims to “decriminalize and deschedule cannabis, to provide for
reinvestment in certain persons adversely impacted by the War on Drugs, to provide for
expungement of certain cannabis offenses, and for other purposes” (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress,
2020). The Act first acknowledges that “the communities that have been most harmed by
cannabis prohibition are benefiting the least from the legal marijuana marketplace” (H.R. 3884,
116th Congress, 2020). It also recognizes the potential economic benefits of legalizing cannabis
for recreational use, as well as the costs of prohibition. The bill calls for the complete
decriminalization of marijuana on the federal level, requires demographic data reporting for
business owners and employees, creates an Opportunity Trust Fund for investing into
communities of color and expungement costs, imposes federal taxes on cannabis, regulates
packaging and testing, establishes a Cannabis Justice Office, has an equitable grant licensing
program, includes automatic expungements for marijuana offenses, and creates other regulatory
rules (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). By decriminalizing cannabis, the MORE Act would
release thousands of federal inmates and reduce the future prison population (CBO, 2020). The
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MORE Act presents an opportunity to move forward as a country, but communication details will
remain crucial to any recreational marijuana program’s success.
The MORE Act does not regulate communications but gives the Secretary of Health and
Human Services one year to “address the regulation, safety, manufacturing, product quality,
marketing, labeling, and sale of products containing cannabis or cannabis-derived compounds”
(H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). It also lacks a direct plan for proper public health
communication and places the responsibility of developing one on the Director of the Cannabis
Justice Office within the Community Reinvestment Grant Program (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress,
2020). Overall, the House has presented a bill to the Senate that addresses some issues that state
legalization fails to, but gaps for future administrative rules remain.
Congress will inevitably write new laws regarding cannabis in the future, and the MORE
Act sets the stage for radical change on the federal level. Congress must carefully curate the
development and implementation of a federal marijuana legalization policy to ensure equitable
access and adequate regulatory structures. An ideal policy would include social equity and racial
justice components greater than those of the MORE Act, automatic expungements, and expanded
access to employment and training for marijuana offenders. The ideal federal cannabis
legalization policy must also address required heightened data collection and analysis.
Researchers need expanded supply options for broader research topics regarding cannabis, and
the policy must address funding for said research. Policies such as the MORE Act assign
communication strategies to other agencies, but these agencies need close monitoring as
communication strategy can affect the policy’s success. Even so, the ideal approach would adapt
more efficiently than our current law and include several other provisions.
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Removal of marijuana from Schedule I alone does not legalize cannabis, and Congress
will likely face challenges in forcing states to legalize it through the Commerce Clause. On the
federal level, however, descheduling the drug “would not affect other existing statutes and
regulations that apply to the drug and thus would not bring aspects of the drug into compliance
with federal law” (Lampe, 2021, p. 29). Without additional legislation, the MORE Act would
have the FDA continue to be in charge of regulating “marijuana and substances derived from the
plant” (Lampe, 2021, p. 31). The agency currently considers interstate commerce involving the
drug unlawful under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Lampe, 2021). Effectively
implementing cannabis reform requires Congress to reduce the administrative barriers to
participation in the industry. Prohibiting the FDA from restricting certain activities involving
marijuana in compliance with state and federal law would allow the states to decide when to use
their police powers to regulate cannabis without federal interference. States can choose to be
more restrictive and use their police powers to do so. The FDA should focus on correcting state
inadequacies in data collection, quality control, research funding, supply chain management,
labeling and packaging, and advertising and communication mechanisms. The federal
government should no longer penalize marijuana use but rather work with states to regulate the
research, communication, and regulation regarding cannabis.
The MORE Act contains several provisions which increase equity in the legal marijuana
industry, but the act does not fully address the problem. The criminal justice system
disproportionately impacts people of color at every level, and it will not cease to do so through
cannabis legalization alone. The act contains a provision that allows regulators to deny permits to
individuals convicted of marijuana-related felonies, which will also disproportionately impact
people of color (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). Dispensaries with white owners have already
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saturated the legal marijuana industry in most states. By allowing felony convictions of
marijuana-related offenses to disqualify people from owning legal cannabis businesses, the act
places more barriers between communities of color and healing from the War on Drugs.
Marijuana legislation cannot solve all of the inequities caused by drug users’ criminalization, but
it should not further harm. The ideal policy would not contain any provisions which would bar
felons from employment or entrepreneurship opportunities. If Congress wishes to reverse the
damage done by the prohibition of cannabis, they must eliminate collateral consequences from
marijuana convictions across industries.
Any comprehensive approach to federal cannabis legalization requires the automatic
expungement of criminal records for those convicted of marijuana offenses. The MORE Act calls
for this; however, not all marijuana-related convictions qualify for the automatic expungement
process in the Act. Just as state expungements do not affect federal criminal records, federal
legislation does not affect state expungement processes or criminal records. Ideally, federal
marijuana legalization would include incentives for the states to develop an automatic
expungement process for all marijuana offenses. The MORE Act only calls for the expungement
of convictions, but arrests that do not result in a conviction may still appear on background
checks and affect employment opportunities. Because people of color are more likely to be
arrested and convicted, the federal government must incentivize automatic expungements on the
state level for all marijuana offenses to create an equitable system for previous marijuana
offenders.
Expanding access to cannabis for medical and recreational consumers but failing to do so
for researchers has constituted one of the biggest state-by-state legalization failures. While the
MORE Act does not address the barriers to research and funding, the House also passed the
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Medical Marijuana Research Act in December 2020. This bill aims to simplify the registration
process for researchers. It also expands supply access by requiring the Attorney General to
register private suppliers complying with stated guidelines by one year from enacting the act
(H.R. 3797, 116th Congress, 2020). Neither law, however, addresses funding or expanding the
methods of consumption that researchers may study. The Medical Marijuana Research Act
would significantly expand accessibility to supply and registration, but it would not fully solve it.
Ideally, cannabis reform would allow researchers to access the same products that consumers do
and fund studies to ensure the public can safely consume the products on the market, and fund
further public health research.
Additionally, the MORE Act calls for data collection regarding business owners and
employees in the marijuana industry but fails to require studies on the effects of legalization
programs. Cannabis reform should seek to create a policy that provides guidelines and evidence
to show which programs work so states can apply them accordingly. The Marijuana Data
Collection Act introduced in the House in 2019 aimed to have federal regulators “conduct and
update biennially a study on the effects of State legalized marijuana programs” (H.R.1587, 116th
Congress, 2019). Congress needs to implement federally sponsored studies to understand the
effects of different regulations. Data from states regarding the impact on vulnerable populations,
public health, the economy, and criminal justice outcomes is crucial in determining how best to
adjust policy in the future.
Effective public health communication regarding legal marijuana requires nuance and
research to reflect the truth in an audience-friendly manner. A campaign cannot combine the
drug with cocaine and heroin convincingly or realistically. Neither tobacco nor alcohol makes
perfect analogies either, as the risks and psychological effects differ as well. Preventing youth
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consumption, however, remains a common goal of all of these campaigns. States can set in place
regulatory advertising standards now. Still, the FDA has enacted regulations to protect children
from tobacco advertising, providing a general outline for cannabis communications with
modification. By truthfully communicating the actual harm caused by underage marijuana use
and explaining the need to reduce marijuana abuse, public health communications can bring
young Americans into the discussion, rather than insisting they say no and ask no further
questions. Labeling, packaging, and advertisements play a prominent role in preventing misuse
of cannabis and informing citizens of mental health risks. Each population requires a different
communication type, but each audience needs communications and regulations that tell them the
truth. States have failed in this regard in many ways, allowing medical marijuana dispensaries to
advertise unproven benefits and recreational marijuana dispensaries to advertise a lack of risk.
Communications on all levels, from advertising to labeling, require heavy regulation to ensure
that young Americans know the dangers of youth consumption of marijuana and that marijuana
users have information on the known risks of acute and long-term use. Congress should make the
federal government’s stance on cannabis clear and ensure that agencies receive and present
transparent information to the public about new scientific understandings.
The MORE Act represents a step forward in how the federal government treats marijuana
in many different aspects, but it lacks key elements of comprehensive cannabis reform. The
public no longer believes that marijuana should be illegal. President Biden has expressed support
for the decriminalization of marijuana on the federal level. Data has not revealed severe adverse
consequences for the states which have legalized. State-by-state legalization has created
scientific research issues, data collection, public health communication, and equity in the
criminal justice and economic realms. The MORE Act begins to address these problems but falls
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short of remedying each area. The ideal marijuana policy moving forward must prohibit the FDA
from restricting activities in compliance with federal and state laws. It must also remove barriers
to employment and entrepreneurship in the marijuana industry based on marijuana offenses, not
only convictions. The ideal policy must allow researchers to access the same products that
consumers can and provide funding for studies on cannabis use. Finally, it must require further
data collection from states that have legalized cannabis and clarify public health communication
strategies.
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Chapter Five
This final chapter examines the future of marijuana politics in the United States in
comparison with international policies and with consideration for the political feasibility of
reform proposals. The first section analyzes approaches taken by the Netherlands and Canada in
comparison with the approach used by the United States. The second section compares proposals
within the previously discussed ideal comprehensive policy to these international policies and
analyzes their preliminary results. Finally, the chapter concludes with several suggestions for
viable incremental change including action by the attorney general, expanding data collection
and research, and rescheduling cannabis.
New Horizons
American experiments of democracy legalizing recreational marijuana have not resulted
in significant societal harms, but these programs highlighted state-by-state legalization failures.
On an international scale, cannabis regulation strategies have varied. Several countries have
recently shifted toward leniency, decriminalization, and legalization. While America intensified
the War on Drugs, the Netherlands decriminalized cannabis in 1976. Their approach allows for
“the existence of outlets for low-volume cannabis sales, outlets that eventually became the wellknown Dutch ‘coffee shops’” (Rolles, 2014, p. 1). Rates of cannabis use in the Netherlands have
remained “equivalent to or lower than those of many nearby countries (which do not have coffee
shops), and are substantially lower than those of the US” (Rolles, 2014, p. 1). While the
Netherlands did not legalize cannabis, their decriminalization and lack of enforcement allowed
for small changes, similar to the incremental approach states have taken in modern years. As the
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United States moves forward with decriminalization and legalization, other international policies
can provide further guidance for policy provisions and public health indicators.
In October 2018, Canada became the second country to legalize recreational marijuana,
following Uruguay’s legalization in 2013 as a strategy against the illegal drug trade. Canada’s
policy had three goals: “to keep cannabis out of the hands of youth, to keep profits out of the
pockets of criminals, and to protect public health and safety by allowing adults access to legal
cannabis” (Rotermann, 2020, para. 2). Results from both incremental and comprehensive
international cannabis reform can provide insights into America’s path forward. As more
countries adopt policies that transform the Netherlands’ idea of decriminalization into
approaches like Canada’s, evaluation of public health and equity indicators will remain crucial to
the programs’ success.
While cannabis legalization remains a relatively new concept, the level of incarceration
in the United States for marijuana possession far exceeds that of its peers. Before legalization,
Canadian police recorded 26,402 marijuana possession cases for 2018, but in 2019 “that number
dropped to 46” (Austen, 2021, para. 19). The United States recorded nearly 700,000 marijuana
arrests in 2018 (ACLU, 2020, p. 21). Despite the United States’s robust criminal justice program
focused on penalizing individuals at all levels, usage rates between Canadians and Americans
have remained incredibly similar. Between 2000 and 2017, between nine and 12 percent of
Canadians reported marijuana use in the past year (Rotermann and Macdonald, 2018). In the
United States, that number moved from seven to nearly 13 percent (Kerr and Yu Ye, 2017).
Preliminary results have found that cannabis use by Canadian youth has not increased since
legalization, but usage has increased among Canadian adults, the same results America has
experienced since the beginning of state-by-state legalization (Rotermann, 2020; CDC, 2017).
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However, usage rate and prevalence of use fluctuations among American and Canadian adults
have moved in tandem with societal norm changes, indicating the need for clear public health
communication strategies (Lake et al., 2019). Canada has faced supply challenges in the legal
cannabis market, but the shift’s societal effects reflect those faced within the states who have
legalized recreational marijuana.
Comprehensive Reform
Public opinion regarding cannabis has shifted within America. 36 states have legalized a
form of marijuana, and 17 have legalized recreational marijuana. Adverse outcomes from
moderate cannabis consumption by adults have failed to materialize, but the effects of
prohibition restrict millions of Americans’ freedoms. Federal law prevents reconciliation
between states moving forward and the communities who have experienced the most harm. The
MORE Act begins to solve the problem by descheduling the drug, removing immigration
penalties for marijuana offenders, instituting opportunity funds for small businesses in adversely
impacted communities, and calling for expedited expungements for federal marijuana
convictions. The Senate remains unlikely to pass the MORE Act due to polarization that has
made comprehensive reform increasingly difficult in the twentieth century (Porterfield, 2020).
The ideal federal policy would go beyond the provisions of the MORE Act to regulate actions by
the FDA, remove barriers to employment and entrepreneurship in the legal cannabis market for
marijuana offenders, heavily incentivize expedited state expungement and legalization processes,
ensure a smooth and free expungement process, provide funding for research, expand products
available for research, require annual state public health studies, and provide a framework for
federal communications.

63

When implementing comprehensive cannabis reform, Congress should ensure that people
across the country receive equitable treatment under the many facets of the law. To do so with
regards to cannabis reform, they must prohibit the FDA from restricting activities allowed under
state and federal law regarding marijuana. The agency should help with data collection, quality
control, research funding, supply chain management, labeling and packaging, and
communication mechanisms. Still, it should not restrict licensed suppliers from conducting legal
business or place heavy restrictions on research. Additionally, the ideal cannabis reform policy
would heavily incentivize state adoption of uniform standards regarding the legality of cannabis,
expungement

processes,

quality

control

mechanisms,

social

equity

programs,

and

communications by withholding portions of federal funding. Without Congressional oversight,
federal and state regulators will be free to place restrictions on the manufacture, consumption,
and distribution of cannabis that could significantly diminish the program’s success.
Barriers to employment and entrepreneurship in the legal marijuana industry will remain
an ongoing challenge for the United States, but it is not alone. White owners constitute 84% of
industry leaders in Canada’s legal cannabis industry (Maghsoudi et al., 2020). The country, like
many states, included social equity provisions when legalizing. Still, the damage that prohibition
already caused to the communities of color proved too pervasive for simple equity measures to
alleviate. The MORE Act attempts to get ahead of this problem by funneling tax revenue from
the program back into the communities that have suffered the most from prohibition, unlike
Canada’s Cannabis Act. Nevertheless, the MORE Act allows regulators to deny licenses to sell
marijuana to people convicted of a marijuana-related felony under the MORE Act. The ideal
federal policy would require that marijuana-related crimes not exclude offenders from profiting
from the legal marijuana marketplace. Congress must also ensure that they encourage robust
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social equity programs in every state to provide equitable access to this growing industry’s
profits.
Canada’s recreational cannabis policy allowed people with a simple possession charge
for cannabis to have their record expunged. People with multiple possession charges do not
qualify for the expedited process, which allowed for free expungements of cannabis expenses,
but required applicants “to travel to the place of their arrest to retrieve their records” to begin the
six-step process (Austen, 2021, para. 26). These requirements created barriers to access. The
MORE Act presents a different set of problems, failing to allow for automatic expungements of
all marijuana offenses, limiting the process to convictions, unlike Canada’s Cannabis Act. The
MORE Act currently requires an automatic expungement process for non-violent federal
cannabis convictions. Still, the only incentive for states to follow suit provides funds to an
equitable licensing grant program for the state (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). The ideal
cannabis policy will need to incentivize state adoption of a uniform automatic expungement
process and expand the process to allow for expungements of arrests that did not end in
conviction. While fair licensing programs will assist communities of color, federal cannabis
reform should grant these funds to all states and incentivize states to legalize and adopt
automatic expungement processes through more effective means. Congress could accomplish
this by withholding federal funds to states who fail to legalize recreational marijuana and
expunge all marijuana offenses. This measure effectively forces equitable treatment of cannabis
users regardless of a person’s state of residence or the state of the offense.
The ideal policy would also increase research funding and researchers’ ability to access
the drug. Researchers currently face a heavily regulated supply chain and lack access to products
that consumers may purchase. Federal financing for general cannabis research has become
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almost nonexistent, despite widespread use of the drug by the public. Upon implementing the
Cannabis Act, Canada funneled millions of dollars into cannabis research (Geary, 2019). Still,
the application process is complicated and often delayed, and researchers struggle to find funding
for general public harm studies, as regulators prefer funding medicinal and substance abuse
studies (Geary, 2019). The Medical Marijuana Research Act, which passed in the House
alongside the MORE Act, addresses the supply chain problem by allowing private manufacturers
and distributors to supply cannabis for research, which Canada also does (H.R. 3797, 116th
Congress, 2020). The Medical Marijuana Research Act would not assist with the rigorous
application process that researchers in both the United States and Canada face obtaining the same
products found in retail dispensaries. The Cannabidiol and Marihuana Research Expansion Act
allows researchers to access other consumption methods while also provides for shifting
regulations regarding that allowance. The ideal policy must ensure an expedited application
process upon legalization and increase accessibility to federal funds for general cannabis
research to reflect the substance’s legal shift. The ideal approach must also expand suppliers and
products that researchers may use to reflect the legal marketplace.
The lack of data collection and analysis on the state level regarding the effects of
cannabis legalization has constituted an enormous failure. While some states have added public
health studies to their legalization plan, they lack detail and consistency. The MORE Act requires
data collection regarding the legal marijuana industry but fails to realize public health data’s
potential to guide future regulation (H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). Canada carefully tracks
the cannabis market and the effects of legalization, allowing the country to tailor regulatory
responses to fill holes left by the initial legislation. For instance, since legalization, Canadians
have increasingly bought cannabis from legal sources and decreasingly purchased from illegal
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sources (Rotermann, 2020). Further data collection regarding the amount of cannabis purchased
and other consumer buying habits may help develop more effective incentives for legal cannabis
consumption (Rotermann, 2020). The Marijuana Data Collection Act, which has stalled in the
House for two years, suggests biennial studies on legalization’s effects in search of similar
insights (H.R.1587, 116th Congress, 2019). As Congress continues to delay action regarding data
collection from legalized states, states will continue to pass legislation that cannot respond to
public health concerns. Ideally, required public health data collection would take effect before
comprehensive legalization or at the minimum simultaneously.
Exaggerations made during the War on Drugs continue in schools across America today,
damaging the credibility of future public health campaigns about cannabis and other drug use
types. The scientific consensus about the potential health benefits and risks of cannabis also
continues to confuse communication efforts. In the past, this confusion led to officials making
baseless claims about risks that the public rejected as misinformation. Future communication
strategies regarding legal recreational cannabis must address these gaps in trust by “recognizing
and acknowledging unknowns and uncertainties” (Steiner et al., 2019, p. 9). Public health
officials in Canada have emphasized the balance between “neither stigmatizing cannabis use
(which drives people to avoid health care or treatment) nor normalizing its use, given that we
suspect it can have serious health consequences for some individuals” (Steiner et al., 2019, p.
10). Canada has also planned targeted campaigns for different populations, such as youth,
business owners, and cannabis tourists (Steiner et al., 2019). To ensure campaigns educating the
public about cannabis use have positive results, the United States must avoid exaggerations or
assumptions. Instead, public health communications should target populations separately and
honestly about the potential risks of cannabis and ways of reducing their risk.
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Cannabis reform in the United States must also include regulations regarding marketing
and packaging within cannabis businesses. Canada has robust packaging requirements that
include prohibiting bright colors or decorative logos and requiring child-proof containers and
testing information labels. In addition, the country included regulations regarding advertising
cannabis products falsely and to children in their law legalizing the drug. The MORE Act gives
federal regulators one year to produce these guidelines. Ensuring robust quality control and
packaging regulations will remain crucial.
Immediate Incremental Reform
Notably, many of the provisions above require Congress to push states for comprehensive
reform. At the same time, analysts predict that the Senate will not pass the semi-comprehensive
reform on the table, the MORE Act. As Americans, and policymakers, remain sharply divided,
the likelihood of ideal reforms remains low. Still, several provisions of the MORE Act and the
ideal federal cannabis reform discussed above have bipartisan goals and outcomes, without
incentives that may cause division and lead to legal challenges. Until Congress can implement
comprehensive reform, altering the Department of Justice’s approach, increasing funding and
choices for researchers, requiring public health data from the states, and legalizing medical
marijuana and allowing doctors to prescribe marijuana may prove more politically feasible.
In 2013, Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a memo explaining that the
Department of Justice would allow states with recreational marijuana to continue to operate
those programs without federal interference (Hansen et al., 2020). Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions reversed that promise in a 2018 memo (Sessions, 2018). Despite this formal reversal, in
practice, the department changed relatively little. President Biden signaled support for cannabis
decriminalization. Still, as the administration plans the path forward, support for cannabis within
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the Department of Justice can help stabilize new state programs and markets. President Biden’s
Attorney General, Merrick Garland, has expressed that he believes the department should “not
allocate our resources to some things like marijuana possession” (Hudak, 2021, para. 4).
Formally declaring a hands-off approach to cannabis prosecution for activities legal under the
state law in which they occur can set the stage for the Biden administration’s intent to support
cannabis reform that the president expressed on the campaign trail. It seems likely that a laissezfaire approach will continue as the norm from the Department of Justice, but an announcement
can help stabilize markets and decrease federal cannabis cases.
Additionally, Garland has expressed a desire to reevaluate “charging policies and stop
charging the highest possible offense with the highest possible sentence” (Hudak, 2021, para. 4).
These decisions can have significant impacts on people throughout the country. Creating
comprehensive policies to mitigate the harm that the criminal justice system has on non-violent
drug offenders can serve as a small, politically feasible step that the executive branch can take.
Garland has acknowledged the disproportionate harm caused to people of color through cannabis
prohibition. He should use his position to work with state laws while advocating for clemency
and policy changes on all available levels.
Other intermediate opportunities for cannabis reform often require bipartisan support, but
there are several areas in which Congress can achieve that. For instance, both parties supported
the Medical Marijuana Research Act and the Cannabidiol and Marihuana Research Expansion
Act. Both appear to have more potential to become law than the MORE Act. The cannabis
industry desperately needs more research. Products have expanded rapidly in these new markets,
growing in potency and changing consumption methods. An expanded supply of different
potencies with easier access to the drug can help researchers understand the products Americans
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buy every day. Expanding data collection can also benefit states with legal cannabis options and
those without, as the stalled Marijuana Data Collection Act sought to do. As more states
continue to move forward with legalization, understanding the effects of the drug on individuals
and these policies on society becomes crucial to creating the optimal approach. Even if the
Medical Marijuana Research Act, the Cannabidiol and Marihuana Research Expansion Act, and
the Marijuana Data Collection Act fail, each of the provisions included in these policies may
have the potential to expand research as part of a larger compromise. By separating the research
and data collection from policies that provide leniency toward the drug, policymakers may have
more success, as the Medical Marijuana Research Act or Cannabidiol and Marihuana Research
Expansion Act may demonstrate.
Many states legalized medical marijuana before the legalization of recreational
marijuana. There are several avenues in which the federal government could consider legalizing
and expanding access to medical marijuana as a stepping stone to comprehensive reform.
Descheduling the drug may be politically infeasible at the moment but rescheduling the drug to a
Schedule II or Schedule III substance would recognize a medical value for the drug.
Rescheduling would increase researchers’ ability to conduct and obtain funding for cannabis
research. Without rescheduling, a lack of research will continue to serve as a barrier to future
legislation. Congressional action serves as the simplest way to reschedule marijuana, as an
amendment to the Controlled Substances Act or through a larger marijuana reform bill (Hudak
and Wallack, 2015; 21 U.S. Code §812). Rescheduling a drug alone does not allow a doctor to
prescribe that drug. Congress could, however, include a provision that requires the FDA to allow
doctors to prescribe cannabis for a range of conditions, encouraging doctors and patients to make
informed decisions as research develops. With 91% of Americans believing that the federal
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government should legalize medical marijuana, seeking to reschedule the drug and expand
prescribing powers through Congress may prove possible sooner than descheduling the drug and
implementing comprehensive reform.
Nevertheless, Congress does not have to act for the United States to reschedule cannabis.
Rescheduling through the executive branch involves the Attorney General, often with the Drug
Enforcement Agency, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services work independently to
evaluate risks and benefits to determine if they should reschedule the drug (Hudak and Wallack,
2015; 21 U.S. Code §812). If the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Attorney
General determine that rescheduling is appropriate, the White House will conduct a regulatory
review. The politics of these many different actors can become complicated, and the executive
branch “may be unwilling to spend political capital on this issue” (Hudak, 2015). Rescheduling
cannabis has the potential to ease tensions between the myriad of state and federal laws, open
doors to treatment for patients nationwide, and provide a path for future reform. Congressional
action remains the easiest path to rescheduling and provides an avenue to expand access to
medical marijuana nationwide.
While most Americans support cannabis legalization, comprehensive reform lacks
political feasibility in today’s polarized climate. Decades of propaganda connecting drug users to
violent crime have led to an overly punitive system that will require decades of reform to
mitigate and correct. These reforms seem unlikely in the current political climate. Still, action by
the Attorney General, bipartisan research and data collection legislation, rescheduling of
marijuana, and expanding prescription options can set the stage for a more responsive political
environment in the future.
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Conclusion
The disjointed nature of marijuana politics in America begs for a federal solution. The
public no longer agrees with prohibition and criminalization, but the legislature remains likely to
gridlock on semi-comprehensive change. Nevertheless, until semi-comprehensive or the ideal
reform can become politically feasible, incremental change can set the stage for expansion.
Action by the Attorney General clarifying the Department of Justice’s intention to not interfere
with state programs and reevaluating charging and sentencing policies would signal the
executive branch’s intentions for progress. Bipartisan Congressional efforts to enhance data
collection and research funding and supply would provide more information to build future
policies. Finally, Congress should reschedule marijuana and expand doctors’ prescribing powers
to promote medical marijuana programs and further expand research opportunities.
The War on Drugs
Political rhetoric has fueled fear about marijuana for nearly a century in America. This
fear allowed for the passage and acceptance of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, which
listed cannabis as a Schedule I drug. Other products of this fear include the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which increased penalties for
drug offenses and allowed for the death penalty in high-level trafficking cases. The bipartisan
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which created the three-strikes rule for
felony drug offenders, also resulted from this fear. After California legalized marijuana for
medical use in 1996 and Colorado legalized it for recreational use in 2012, federal policymakers
noticed the changing tide of marijuana politics. The First Step Act of 2018 reduced mandatory
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minimums for drug offenders, increased the seriousness of the crime required to trigger the
mandatory sentences, and expanded compassionate release options while retroactively applying
the Fair Sentencing Act. In December 2020, the House passed the most comprehensive
legislation regarding cannabis reform to pass either chamber of Congress, the MORE Act.
Public Perception
Concern for drug use among Americans reached a peak in the 1980s and has declined
since then. At the height of the War on Drugs, approximately 25% of Americans believed the
federal government should legalize cannabis (Jones, 2019). In 2014, 67% of Americans believed
low-level marijuana offenders should face no jail time, 63% supported removing mandatory
sentences, and 67% believed the government should focus on drug offenders’ treatments over
punishment (Doherty et al., 2014). In 2020, 68% of Americans believed the government should
legalize recreational marijuana, and 91% believed it should legalize medical marijuana (Brennan,
2020a). Partisan and generational differences remain, and these intertwine to make cannabis
reform politically risky.
Changing Landscape
36 states have some type of cannabis program. 17 states and the District of Columbia
have legalized recreational marijuana. Recreational marijuana, medical marijuana, and CBD
legalization have become regular updates to the American political landscape. The Court has
been deferential to Congress regarding cannabis policies. Congress largely ignored the issue until
December 2020, when the House of Representatives passed the MORE Act. President Obama’s
administration announced that they would not interfere with state cannabis programs, and
President Biden and Trump have continued that tradition.
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State medical and recreational marijuana programs have had success, but they remain
limited in their ability to heal wounds caused by nearly a century of federal cannabis prohibition.
The implementation of these programs has not resulted in increases in crime or adolescent use
(Chu & Townsend, 2019; Lu et al., 2019; Makin et al., 2018; Brinkman & Mok-Lamme, 2019).
Rates of drivers testing positive for cannabis in states with recreational marijuana have increased
slightly, but roadside testing for the drug can be unreliable, and traffic fatalities have not changed
significantly (Bloch, 2020; Leyton, 2019). The economies of states that have legalized cannabis
have benefitted from the change as the industry brought jobs and tax revenue (Colorado
Department of Revenue, 2020; Ingraham, 2016). Despite these successes, states with recreational
marijuana still struggle with equity and data issues. Black and Hispanic people still face higher
arrest rates for marijuana offenses, and the legal marijuana industry remains overwhelmingly
white (Colorado Department of Public Safety, 2018; Analytic Insight, 2020; Schuba, 2020). Data
collection and research issues have also plagued state programs (NASEM, 2017).
Current Reality
In the past, inflammatory rhetoric dominated marijuana politics, but expanding marijuana
use and evolving state laws have decreased public fear. Despite the change in the American
psyche, prohibition continues to have adverse consequences for millions of individuals. In 2018
alone, almost 700,000 people were arrested for marijuana offenses, approximately 90% of which
were for possession (ACLU, 2020). Despite similar cannabis use rates across races, Black and
Hispanic people face higher arrest rates, higher incarceration rates, and longer sentences on
average than white people (ACLU, 2020; H.R. 3884, 116th Congress, 2020). Collateral
consequences from arrests and convictions pose barriers to employment, entrepreneurship,
student loans, and other federal benefits (Thompson, 2017; Lampe, 2021).
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New Horizons
The MORE Act would decriminalize cannabis on the federal level, require data from legal
marijuana markets, invest in communities of color and expungement costs, regulate packaging
and testing, establish a Cannabis Justice Office, establish an equitable grant licensing program,
create an expedited expungement process for federal marijuana convictions, and establish other
regulatory rules. Still, it fails to adequately regulate FDA action, remove barriers to employment
and entrepreneurship, incentivize expedited state expungement and legalization, expand research
funding and supply, require public health data collection, or provide a framework for
communications. Ideally, Congress would overhaul the system of cannabis prohibition that has
caused harm to communities of color across the country. In reality, the federal government has
several avenues of incremental change that can begin the move away from prohibition
immediately.
These incremental changes should begin immediately with the Attorney General for the
Biden administration announcing that the Department of Justice will not interfere with legal state
markets. The Attorney General should also reevaluate sentencing and charging policies in favor
of leniency for marijuana offenders. Bipartisan Congressional action regarding the expansion of
research supply and funding, data collection regarding the effects of cannabis programs have the
potential to pass immediately. Finally, the legislature should reschedule marijuana and expand
doctors’ prescribing powers to decrease incarceration, increase research, and destigmatize the
drug.
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